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SOME CORPORATE ANllJ) SlECUJPUTIES LA ~V
PJER§JPECT1IVES ON STIJIDENT-A lf'ltiJ LETES
AND 111DE NC l~A
D AVID A. SKEEL, JR . ~

Since its inception in 1905 as a response to the growing violence in
college footb all, the National Coll egiate Ao'1letic Association (NCAA) has
expanded its oversight to nearly every sport at nearly every college and
university. In keeping with its stated goal of protect ing ainateur athletics
at the university level, the NCAA prescribes and enforces regulations on
issues ranging from recruitment and compensation of college athletes to
the format for championship tournaments. 1
The NCAA's vast authority over college athletics raises obvious
questions of accountability. Who, we might ask, is responsible for
overseeing the way that the NCAA a11d its member institutions oversee
coll ege athletics, and for ensuring that t.he regulatory apparatus is fair and
effective for the various constituencies who participate in or are affected
by college sports? The answer is far from clear. Student-athletes and
universities with grievances most frequently challenge the NCAA on
constitutional and related grounds, often arguing that the NCAA imposed
penalties on them without adequate due process. These suits do not seem
particularly promising, however, as courts have tended to show broad
deference to NCAA procedures .2

* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University . I would like to thank Sue
Ehrmann, Will Anzenberger, and the Wisconsin Law Review for inviting me to participate
in this symposium; Jane Baron, Peter Carstensen, Deborah DeMott, JoAnne Epps, Nancy
Knauer, Paul Olszowka, Robert Reinstein , Joel Seligman, Max Stearns and participants
at the conference held in connection with this symposium and at a faculty colloquium at
Temple University School of Law for helpful comments on earlier drafts; and Christine
Taran for excellent research assistance.
1.
Much of the NCAA's regulatory framework is codified in the NCAA Mamtal,
which contains the NCAA's constitution, its operating bylaws, and its administrative
regulations. For a helpful discussion of the history and current structure of the NCAA,
see Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Azhletic Association 's Death Penalty: How
Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L .J. 985 (1987).
2.
For instance, in a high-profile Supreme Court decision involving Jerry
Tarkanian, the former men's basketball coach at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas, the
Supreme Court rejected Tarkanian's due process challenge to the NCAA's disciplinary
actions against him and his program. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 454 (1988). The
one prominent suit the NCAA did lose was an antitrust challenge to its regulation of
college football television rights . N C/\.J\ v. Board of Regents, 462 U.S. 1311 (1983).

670

WISCONSIN LA \V REVIEW

The goal of this Article is to look in a very different
direction-corporate and securities lRw-a:nd consider whether any of the
accountability devices used in that context might prov ide an effective
means of policing intercollegiate athletics . In keeping with the tt1eme of
this symposium, I will focus in particular on student-athletes. Thus, the
question I ask throughout L~e Articl e is whether one or more corporate or
securities law strategies might give student-athletes a greater say in, or
more effective protection with respect to , NCAA decisionrna.'dng. 3
Many of the most frequent criticisms of the NCAA and its member
inst itutions relate to their treatment of student-att'Jletes who parti cipate in
the most prominent revenue sports, Division J-A football and men's
Dlv~s ion I basketbalL Despit~ the vast amount of income these sports
bring in, the NCAA prohibits a university from paying its studentathletes, and strictly regulates student-athletes' ability to transfer or to hire
an agent during their college careers. Critics of these regulations point
out that the member universities that run t'le NCAA have perverse
incentives when it comes to considering the effect the regulations have on
student-athletes, since t1e universities themselves derive a direct finan cial
benefit from limiting student-athlete compensation and restricting
mobility . In their preoccupation w ith develop ing successful football and
basketball programs, NCAA member institutions may also fail to pay
sufficient attention to whether student-athletes receive an adequate
education during their college careers .
This brief description might seem to suggest that student-athletes
have a discrete set of interests that may be subverted by the NCAA
dec isionmaking process. Yet even w ithin the limited context of revenueproducing sports, student-athlete interests are far from uniform. While
the limits on compensation seem to penal ize the very best football and
basketball players, for instance, other athletes may actually benefit if
restrictions on marketable players leave more money for granting
scholarships and related support to those who are not among the very best
aih1etes . The NCAA.'s obligation to promote education as a key element
of amateurism raises equally difficult issues. Who is to say whether an
aspiring football player's belief tl,.at raising the NCAA's minimum
academic sta_i1dards \vou id jeopardize his prospects for a pro career, or

3.
Since t.he symposium's focus is on student-athletes , my analysis of NCAA
decisionmaking considers the student-athlete' s relationship with her univers ity as well.
In fact, several of the papers presented at the conference argue that fo r meaningful change
to occur, much of it must take place at the university level. See John R. Allison, RuleMaking Accuracy in the NCAA and lts Member Institutions: Do Their Decisional
Structures and Process Promote Educatiorwl Primacy for the Student-Athlete?, 44 K.AN.
L . REv. (forthcoming 1995); Ti..'llothy Davis, A Model of lnslitutiona l Governan.cefor
intercollegiate Athletics, 1995 WIS . L. REV . 599.
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NCAA decisionmakers' parentalistic desire to force high school athletes
to focus on academics, should be seen as the appropriate student-athlete
"interest" to consider? The multiplicity of student-athlete perspectives
becomes still more striking when we take into account gender equity
issues, or the differences between student-athletes at Division I schools
and those at smal ler institutions. 4
However problematic it is to speak of student-athletes as if their
interests were consistent and well-defined, one th ing is d ear. NCAA &'1d
member institution decisionmakers have traditionally been the only actors
w ith authority to determine what is best for everyone involved in
intercollegiate athletics, including student-athletes. The l'ICAA has taken
a few steps to give student-athletes more of a voice, such as providing for
student advisory committees. 5 Yet the steps are extremely tentative thus
far. It may therefore be an opportune time to consider whet.~er a~.1other
perspective, such as corporate law , might provide new insight on the
relationship between student-athletes and the NCAA.
Corporate and securities law can be seen as offering two distinct
approaches that one might employ on behalf of student-athletes. The first
focuses on what I will describe as "internal" corporate governance, and
includes governance devices such as board representation and litigation to
enforce fiduciary duties. According to this view, adding student-athlete
representatives to the NCAA's primary decisionmaking bod ies might
enable student-athletes to voice their concerns directly. In the alternative,
if NCAA and member institution decisionmakers' fiduciary duties
included a duty to student-athletes, student-athletes could sue to enforce
this duty, and the prospect of such suits might force the decisionmakers
to articulate more clearly their own views on the NCAA and member
institutions' obligations to student-athletes.
The arguments that student-athletes should be given direct
representation, and that the NCAA and its member universities owe a
duty to student-athletes, bear a close resemblance to a longstanding debate
in the for-profit context over corporate directors' accountability. 6

4.
The distinction between Division I and other schools is significantly dramatic
to support a strong argument for bifurcating their regulation completely. For a discussion
of the incomplete distinctions made in the current decisionmaking framework, see Allison,
supra note 3.
5.
At the 1.995 Convention in January, the NCAA membership passed a measure
adding student-athlete advisors to five NCAA committees. See Jack L. Copeland,
Student-Athlete Welfare Principles Ovenvhebningly Adopted, N C.i'\.'\ NEWS , Jan. 11, 1995,
at 7. i discuss this and related measures in Part H.
6.
The debate is usually traced back to an exchange between Adolph Berle, who
argued that directors should focus on shareholders' interests , and Merrick Dodd, who
argued that the directors should also consider interests of employees and other
constituencies. See generally Adoiph Berle, Corporate Powers os Powers Held in Trust,
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Although corporate law hc>,s trad itional ly held that directors are
responsible solely to shareholders, and that directors should work to
ma;dmize the val ue of shareholders ' stock, a chorus of dissenting voices
has consistently cal led for a fiduciary duty to, or board representation of,
other constituencies such as employees, consumers and local

communities. 7
Just a.s for-profit directors have trad itionally ma.ilaged with their
shareholders in mind, t'"Je NCAA is run by and for its member institutions
rather tha.'1 for student-athletes. From this perspective, student-athlete
representation would entail an expansion of the NCAA's focus quite
similar to adding employ e.~ o:r consumer representatives to a fo r-profit
corporation board. Yet the case for student-athlete representation in the
NCAA is in many respects far more compelling u'1an the argu ments for
adding nonshareholder representatives to L.l-;e boards of for-profit
corporations. Moreover , whereas most for-profits do not incl ude multiple
constituencies on the board , no nprofit corporations such as nonprofit
hospitals, charities and some univers ities do include representatives of
designated interests. As in ot..her for-profit and nonprofit contexts , both
d irect representation and fiduc iary duty litigation suffer from significant
shortcomings as sources of NCAA accountability. Yet both offer some
promise, and the fiduciary duty approach in particular may improve on
what currently exists.
The second general approach to NCAA accountability would be to
establish a framework for external review. The antitrust laws already
serve as one source of external review of NCAA decisionmaking. I focus
in this Article on another possible model, a framework drawn from the
Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) regul ation of the stock
exchanges . 8 The heart of this fr amework is a system of dual regulation:
the exchange registers as a "self-regulatory organization" and ordinaril y
governs itself in the first instance, but the SEC retains broad authority to
work with or unilateral ly regulate the exchange in appropriate
circumsta.'lces . Although at first glance the NCAA seems to have little

44 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (1931); E. Ivlerrick Dodd, J r., For VVhom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV . L. REv. 1145 (193 2); Ado lph Berle, For Whom Corporate
Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932).
7.
Somewhat similar questions respecting the appropriate constituencies arise in
the nonprofit context.
8.
The regulatory scheme desc1ibed in this paragraph is not limited to exchanges,
and currently governs related entities such as the National Association of Securities
Dealers . The framework is described in more detail in Part IV . To my knowledge , Peter
Carstensen was the first to suggest the analogy between the NCAA and se<:urities law
regulation of the exchanges. Thus, my disc ussion develops his insight, no doubt taking
it at times in directions he would not have intended.
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in common with a stock exchange, the analogy proves on inspection to be
surprisingly close. My analysis suggests that SEC-style regulation would
give a regulator the flexibility to tak:e advantage of the NCAA's expertise,
yet also the authority to intervene whe:u appropriate. Securities-style
regul atio n is in some respects the most attractive of the corporate law
accountability mechanisms. It chief limitations are the practical barriers
to its implementation, and the uncertainty about whether such an extensive
reform is necessory.
In the Part that foll ows, i briefly discuss the significance of the
NCAA's organizational stmcture. Parts H and HI cons ider the efficacy
of internal corporate governance mechanisms as a means of enhancing
NCAA accountability to stude:nt-athJetes, ailct Part IV tu rns to securitiesstyle external review.

L

T HE

NCAA

AS ,1\N UNINCORPOR:H ED .ASSOCIATION

Perhaps the first surprise about the NCAA from a corporate
governance perspective is its organizational form. Rather than being
structured as a nonprofit corporation, as one might expect, the NCAA is
organized as an unincorporated association located in Kansas. 9 The
NCAA is at least nominally run by and for its roughly 1000 member
colleges and universities. Under the NCAA's constitution, each member
is entitled to vote on the proposed rule changes and additions considered
at the annual convention, where much of the NCAA's major business is
conducted. The members elect committees to carry on NCAA business
between the conventions. 10
While the NCAA is structured as an unincorporated association, most
of its members are themselves nonprofit wrporations. Moreover, the
NCAA has incorporated several aspects of its business. The Association
has incorporated for-profit corporations both to hold title to the land and
buildings that it owns and to market the NCAA logo . 11 The Association

9.
See, e.g., NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining NCAA
history and organizational form).
10.
See 1994-95 NCAA MANUAL art. 4.1.4 (Council members elected at annual
convention); id. art. 4.4.4 (Administrative Committee elected at convention); id. art . 4.5.4
(Presidents Commission elected by chief executive officers of member institutions); id.
art. 5.1 (regulations governing convention); id. art. 5 .3 (amendments made at convention).
The Executive Committee is the one central committee whose members are not directly
elected by the NCAA's membership. The Council rather than the membership as a whole
chooses the Executive Committee. Id. art. 4.2.4.
Although I will analogize the NCAA to a corporation, its decisionmaking structure
resembles a private legislature in many respects, as this discuss ion suggests.
11.
!d. art. 31.9.1 (National Collegiate Realty Corporation); id. art. 31.9.2
(NCAA Marketing Corporation) .

r
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has also structured its charitable foundation as a nonprofit corporation. 12
Thus, the NCAA can be seen as an unincorporated association comprised
of no nprofit corporation members, and -,vhich has established for -profit
and nonprofit corporations to carry on various aspects of its business .
itVhy might the member universities continue to run the N C AA as a11
unincorporated association rather t1 an as a nonprofit or even a for -proflt
corporation? 13 Entities such as labor uni{:;.ns have traditionally operated
as incorporated associaiions at least in patt to a'!Oid some of the
consequences of corporate '" 'personhood,, such as ~1e capacity to be sued
in tl'le corporate name. 14 Many states now auLi)ori.ze suit against 3.1"1
association, so t..l-Jis d istinction has lost some of its force. u But similar
co ncerns continue to explain rcmch of the attractiveness of unincorpontl_ed
status. i\n association still cannot sue or be sued (or hold property) in
association nat-ne unJess state law explicitl;/ or 1mplicitly authorizes
suit. 16 The association form may also diminish the likelihood that u1e
NC AA will qualir; as a state actor, thus hel ping to insulate its poli cies
from certain constitutional challenges . In short, an obvious advantage of
organizing as an unincorporated association is that it minimizes the
likelihood of regulatory interference with NCAA policies and actions . 17
T o appreciate the significance of the NCAA ' s choice of form from
a corporate governance perspective, consider first u'le distinctio ns between
for-profit and nonprofit corporations. No nprofits differ fr om fo r-profit
corporations in two ways : state law ordinar ily prohi bits a nonpro-fit from
making dividends or other distributions to its constituents, and nonprofits
do not have shareholders in the same sense as for -protits. 18 In a pair of

12.
!d. art. 31.9.3 (NCAA Foundation).
13.
lt is pDssible, of course, that the NCA.A's unincorporated status is simply the
perpetuation of a historical accident. This seems unlikely, hov>'evcr, and the discussion
that follows suggests several possible motivations for remaining unincorporated.
14 .
See, e.g., HOWARD L. 0LECX, NONPROFHCORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATiONS,
AND ASSOCIATiONS 102-03 (4th ed . 1980).
15 .
Se e, e.g., Harry G. Henn & lV! ichael G. Pfeifer, Nonprofit Groups: Factors
Influencing Choice of Form, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 18 1, 191-92 (1975) .
16.
See, e.g., lVl urray v . Sevier, 156 F .R. D. 235 (D. i{an. 1994); Kansas Private
Club Ass'n . v. Londerholm, 408 P.2d 891 (Kan. 1965). Associations are subje.ct to suit
under federal law , however. Federal Rule of Civil Proced ure 17(b) prov ides that
regardless of its status under state law , any association may sue or be sued !n its common
name for the purpose of enforcing a substantive right existing under the Constitution or
laws of the United States.
17.
Prior to the reforms set in motion by the .Securities EJ<change Act of 193 r-~,
the New York Stock E;{change had long eschewed i11corporaticn for pr·x isely the same
re<~sons . Se e Richard W . .lennings , Self Regulmion in the Securiti,; s Industry : Th e Role
of the SEC, 29 LAW & COl'>l!E.MP. PRO:t'>S . &63, 667-68 (1964).
18.
Se,?, e.g., Deveiopments in the L.aw: Nonprofit Corporatior.s, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 1580, 1582 (1992) [hereinafter Developments].
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classic articl es on flonpr ofits, H enry Hansman.I1 contende.::! that the
relationship between these attributes is not ac ci d~ntal. D He argued th at

a cor·-l•ractual b'~" ·"'"'1-1ju~rvn i--''""'"'olem
Th·
.!V
•
.l .. v
nondistd bution rule compensates for t11e fact that a nonprotit' s
ent by strictly
constituents are oft:::m "poorlv situated to monitor r:n ana~em
~
.J;m:tmg
. ..
' "1'1ty to d"1vert assets to tEemse.ves
-·~
l
1111s
.
managers , am
.
protection corm:.s at a "orice, however. Because tbt;y. c:;umot seE stock and
do not have stockho lders to encourage ma.11agers to emph i!si:ze fina11c ial
retl.Jm, nonprofits oh:e:n have difficulty obtaining fin ancing from lenders
and similar sour\;.% .2 t
lt is immediate ~ ; apJ.Y:trent Lt:!at the N CAA is simil2.r \\1 some respects,
but not in udwrs, r.o this generalized account of no nprofi·~ corporations .
Uk~ a nonprof}\ co:cporation, the NCAA' s o.ssociation form. m<1y affect its
abi lity to obtain fln.::mcing . This, together '.Vith tax ~.::on c erns and lingering
•
•
'
•
•
,
•
,
1 l
.
1.mcertamtr~s ~'lOOlJt an assocJatiOn s capac1ty to i'lOJC. property m
association no:\rt\:;, tnay explain th e NCAA's decision to set up for-profit
corporations for its marketi:ng efforts and to hoid its property .12
Although the l\lCAA lacks a shareholder constituency as a result of its
association form , its members are actively involved in 'CAA governance
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21)

and well-positioned to monitor its management. 23 From this perspective,
the NCAA res..;mbles mutual nonprofits, which are run by and for their
membersl-1 to a much greater extent than donor nonprofits such as
charities.
By eschewing the for-profit form, despite Lhe obvious profit motives
that enter into many of the NCAA ' s activities, member institutions assure
themselves complete control o ver NCAA operations. To the extent that
members' interests do not confl ict with those of student-athletes, the
association fo rm se:rves both quite effectively . This may not always be
the case, however , especially given the obstacles to accountability an
association poses. TI-1e followi ng Parts explore v.;hether corporate

19.
Henry B . H ansmann, Reforming Nonpr~jit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 497 (1 981) [hereinafter Refimning Nonprofit]; Henry B . Ha.nsmann, The Role of

Nonprofit EnterprLre, 39 YALE LJ . 835 (1980) [hereinafter The Ro!e of Nonprofit ].
20 .
Set', e.g., Hansmann, The Role ofNonproji.t, supra note 19, at 343 -45 .
21.
id. ~lt 877 .
22 .
The most obvious ta.x concem is that the for-profit activ ities wou ld jeopardize
the NCAA' s nonpmfiLstatus .
23 .
The nondistrib ution constraint (which does not by its terms app ly to an
unincorp-oratr_.d 2.ssociation) is thus les s impo rtant for the N CA./;. than fo r charitable
non profits. ·M oreover, the NCAA' s ab ility to make distribut:ons is limited by lntemal
Rev~nue Code rcst1~ct ion s O!l nonprofit organizations .

24.

Se e, e.g. ,

;-t.n~ smar:n ,

The F.c•le of Nonprofit, siJ.pm note 19, at 892-94

(describ ing certain mutud nonprotits, such as social clubs , as an except ion to the co ntract
failure expJan;:ltio n for t.he nonpro tit form).
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governance devices might offer more input and /or protections to studentathletes , and what adjustments may be requ ired in order to tailor these
devices to the NCAA ' s association fo:rm .25

H. INTERNAL

CO RPO ~<\TE GOVERNANC E: P UTIING STUDENT-ATHLETE

REPRESE NTATIVES ON

NCAA

('\!"''D MEMBER INSTITUTION)

C oMMITTEEs

The interests of shareholders are represented in two general ways in
the for-profit corporation context. First, shareholders are represented
directly , in that they are entitled to choose d ir0etors who will pursue their
interests . 26 Corporate law fid uciary duty standards reinforce d irectors '
obligations to shueholders,
Xn addition to selecting directors ,
shareholders may sue d irectors who h3Pre violated any of their fi duciary
duties.
The next two Parts exain ine th ese protections' effectiveness for
student-athletes. This Pa..rt cons iders th e efficacy of direct student-athlete
representation; Part HI turns to fid ucioxy duty.
As noted above, the NCAA conducts much of its business at its
annual convention , where member institutions vote on proposed legislative
action. The fo rty-four member Council, together with the Presidents
Commission, wields much of the NCAA's . decisionmaking authority
between conventions . 27 While member institutions correspond roughly
to shareholders, and the governi ng councils to the board of a for-profit
corporation, members play a much more active (and managerial) role in
NCAA decisionmaking, since they vote directly on much of the NCAA's
business at the annual convention. 2g

25.
As noted at the outset, '..Vhile my initial focus is on NCAA-level
decisionmaking, I also consider the applicability of several of these protections at the
member institution level.
26.
See, e.g. , DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 2 11 (1994) (shareholder voting on
directors). Shareholders also vote directl y on extraordinary matters. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1994) (mergers) .
27.
See, e.g., 1994-95 NCAA M ANUAL art. 4.1.3 (Council's powers between
conventions); id. art. 4. 5 .3 (powers of Presidents Commission). Since its establishment
in 1984, and contrary to early suspicion that it would play only a superficial role, the
Presidents Commission has become increzsingly powerful in NCAA affairs. The
Presidents Commission currently has sub stantial control over the convention agenda, for
instance, and has veto pDWer over the selection of the NCAA Executive Director. ld. art.
4 .5.3(b) (respD nsibility for uplac[ing] any matter of concern on the agenda"); id. art .
4.5 .3(h) (power to uapprove the appointment of an <:xecutive director of the Association").
For a description of the origins and rise of the Presidents Commission, see Smith, supra
note 1, at 998-1005.
28.
The NCA/\ thus function s somewhat like a hybrid between a publicly held
corporation, whose shareholders play only a minimal role , and a clo sely held corporation,

1995:669

Persp.ectives on Stud?at-Arh!etes

677

One ·way to emiance student-athletes' voice would be to give them
representation eit1er at the anrmal convention or on the pri ncipal ·NCAA
committees, or both. 29 For followers of for-profit corporation law , this
suggestion wHl have a strikingly fam il iar ring . A call to add an addition <:~J
constituency-here, student-athletes- to the NCAA's decisionmak:ing
process paral lels in many ways the period ic movements to place employee
representatives on the boards of fo r-profit coq.~orations 30 or to implement
cumulativ-e voting to maximize the likelihood that minority interests wiH
elect at least one director. 31 Kn both contexts, inclusion is j ustified as 2
means of ensuring that deci. sio nm~cers will pay closer attention to the
constituency in question .
Interestingly, while a caB for sruclem--at.l-:ilcte representation mirrors
efforts to implement employee co-representation in mai1Y respects, th;;:
case fo r student-athlete representation may actually be appreciably
stronger. Because the traditional view of corporate law holds that
directors' prin1ary respons ibility is to maxirnize profits for shareholders ,
observers have long criticized direct employee representation as
undermining directors' focus on shareholder interests. 32 Moreover,
employees arguably do not need a governance mechanism like voting,
since in theory t.t1ey can use contractual arrangements to protect
themselves against exploitation far more effectively than shareholders. 33

whose shareholders serve both as shareholders and as managers of the finn . See also
supra note 10 (NCAA in some r-espects more like a private legislature than a corporation).
29.
Giving student-athletes direct representation at the university level would offer
similar benefits, and suffer from similar limitations, as I discuss in somewhat more detail
below.
30.
The movement to place representatives on corporate boards, often described
as "co-representation," was particularly prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, and was
inspired by the use of co-representation in Germany and other European countries. See,
e.g., Clyde W . Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Gennany: A
Comparative Study from a US. Perspective, 28 A.ill!. J . COMP. L. 367 (1980).
31.
For a recent discuss ion of cumulative voting, and an argument that
institutional shareholde rs should look to it as a means of enhancing their ability to monitor
for-profit boards, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look
at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 124 (1994).
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26
32.
J .L. & EcoN. 395, 405 (1 983) (describing the agency costs of multi-constituency
representation).
Oliver Williamson , Corporate Governance, 93 YALE LJ. 1197 (1984).
33.
Williamson argues that contractual safeguards are a means of curbing opportunism that
might otherwise occur in contexts where the parties have invested in transaction-specific
assets; that is, where the parties have committed resources to a contract that could not b,e
fu lly recouped elsewhere if the contract were to fall through . .AJthough employees malce
such an investment ·when they acquire fl1'111-sp-ecific skills, \Villiamson argues that
employees can bargain fot termination fees and other devices in order to protect
themselves. !d. at 1207-09 . For an argument that employees may nevertheless benefit
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Both arguments lose much of their force in the NCAA context.
However commercial the NCAA may be, maximizing profits for its
members is not, or at least should not be, the NCAA's sole goal. The
NCAA ' s constitution, for instance, defines the '" physical and educational
wel fare of student-athletes" as a fu ndamental principle of intercollegiate
athletics. 34 At tile least, student-athletes should be seen as third party
beneficiaries of the agreements entered into by member institutim1.s and
the NCAA. Unlike employee repres entation on a for-profit board, t.'l)en,
student-athl ete representation would reinforce rather tt1an distract the
NC AA from its primary objectives .
Student-athletes are also less able to secure contractual safeguards
tha..'1 employees. As noted above, employees theoretically can protect
their interests in their existing jobs by negotiati ng for contractual
safeguards such as the right to a term.inatiol:1 fee if fired. Consequentl y,
they may not need or benefit from the add itional protection of
representation on the employer's board of directors. 35 Student-athletes
are particularly vulnerable, since their eligibility is limited to a brief
period of a few years; yet they have almost no means of protecting their
interests by contract. 36 This is especially true of those athletes who hope
to move on to a professional career, since college athletics is the most
important (and for many, the only) opportunity they have to develop and
demonstrate their talents. 37 Given the absence of other protections, one

from board representation because of long-term commitments to their existing jobs, see
John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game,
78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990).
34.
1994-95 NCAA MANUAL a1t. 2.2.
35.
Vv'hether employees do in fact have access to adequate contractual protections
is, of course, debatable, even if one considers not only explicit contractual provisions but
also the effect that external market pressures have on wages and working conditions. For
present purposes, my ptincipal point is that whatever one's view of employees' need for
representation, student-athletes seem to have a significantly greater claim .
36.
Professor Remington makes an interesting argument that student-athletes
should in fact seek, and NCAA member institutions should give, explicit contractual
protections such as a commitment to continue the student's scholarship after her eligibility
expires. Frank J. Remington, Universities and Student-Athletes: Keeping Promises and
Fulfilling a Mission, 1995 Wrs. L. REv. 765. \\'hile these kinds of provisions would
provide many student-athletes with iiubstantially more protection than voting rights, the
parties' current failure to agree to such provisions underscores the need for other sources
of protection, such as voting rights. The bargaining asymmetry between the parties and
the difficulty of spelling out the university's respo nsibilities in complete detail may also
reinforce the possible value of a fiduciary duty approach in the absence of, or in addition
to, explicit contract terms, as I discuss in Part HI.
37.
The brevity of a college athlete's ca reer makes unionizing les s likely in the
NCAA than in the pro fessional sports context. The strict limitations on compensation and
transfer reinforce student-athletes' vuL11erability . See 1994-95 NCAA. MANUAL art. 15 .1
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can make a st:wng argument that student-athletes an:: precisely the kind of
constituency tor whom direct representation makes sense. 35
A comparison to th e nonprof1t sector reinforce,;; the case for studentathl ete representation . Unlike for-protlts, which generaliy do not provide
for multiple constituency representation , rnany nonprofits include
representatives of specific interests on their boards. T.his is por ticuarly
true of charitable nonprofits such as tmiversrtles, hospital s and
organizatiom such as t.h e Y.tviCA that do not h<rve a sitlgle, v;eH-defined
constituency.
The NCAA has in fact begun to increase stud~nt·at.h ietes' inf!u.e:nee
i:n I"-JCAA dedsiomnaking. In addition to requiriri;g ;;:ach member
institution to establish a student-athlete advisory com.mhtee, the
membership voted at the most recent convention to add student-.athlete
advisors to fi ve NCAA comm.ittf'.-es. 39 The obvim1s limitarion of these
reforms is that each restricts student-athletes to an informal role, rather
than giving them direct decisionmaking authority. <o The question, then ,
is whether student-athletes deserve actual voting pmver at the I'>JCAA or
member institution level.
One possible concern with direct representation involves another
objection frequently directed at co-representation proposals in the forprofit context: that adding student representatives would create a problem
economists describe as "cycling. " 41 The concern is that, however
laudable the objectives may be, ensuring representation on the Council or
(student-athlete ineligible if receives more than a full grant-in-aid); id. art. 14.5 . 1
(student-athlete must sit out one year after transfer) . Notice that the transfer rule, while
undermining a student-athlete's position, acts as a safeguard for the athlete's university,
since it reduces the risk that a student-athlete will defect to anothe r school.
38.
An alternative approach might be to relax the restrictions on student-athletes'
ability to contract. Commentators and at least one activist hav;~ long advocated this step,
arguing in pa rticular that college athletes should be paid . See , e.g . , Lee Goldman, Sports
and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play? , 65 N o TRE DAl\iE L. REV. 206
(1990); ML.~eJensen, Play-for-Pay Advocate Goes 1-on-J with !VCAA, PHILA. INQUIRER.,
Nov. 18, 1994, at Al (describing Dick DeVenzio's 12-year campaign to alter NCAA
compensation restrictions).
39.
See Jack L. Copeland, Student-Athlete We lf ar e Principles Overwhelmingly
Adopted, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 11, 1995, at 7. Student-athletes are also members of some
universities ' delegations to the Convention. See Allison, supra note 3 (questioning
efficacy of student-athletes' input in a delegation or on the Adviso ry Committee) .
40.
The NC.V, does give (limite-d) direct representation to w om.:on and, to a lesser
extent, minorities. Se,;; 1994-95 NCAA fv!A'\,fUAL art. 4 .1.1 (tequiring at least 12 women
on the 44-member Council); id. art. 4.2.1 (at least th ree women on 1 4 -memb e:~ Executive
Committee); id. art. 4.5.1 (at least three \Nomen on 4-4-member Executive Committee) .
Some conferences give student-athletes a direct roie in co nference decisionn1aking .
41.
Easte rbrook & Fischel, supra note 32 , a t t~05; W illiam J . Carney , Does
Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 CI!'IN. L. :REV. 3g5 , 420-22 (1 990) .
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other con1Jxdtiees to groups with particul ar perspectives (such as at.l-J.letes',
women's, or minorities' interests) could seriously undermine th ese bodies'
ability to spea.~ with a coh erent, unifl ed voice. As a result, the committee
(or t.1 e membership as a whole, in the context of the annual convention)
might enact a series of inconsistent ru1 es 2L5 various coalitions formed and
then shifted, or it might hw e difficu l~y enacting anything in t.t'1e r1rst
instai1ce. 42
The NCAi-\ do:es differ ifro:m a for -profit corporation in at least ODe
'+h> resp·x:r. 1:0
. eye"l"mg. ''lF'
~·. d'
,
, I :mcus
"
way Wlu
t nerea.s c·toor-pro:!n
1recwrs
arguan.y
on the single, weB-defined goal of ens 1Jrlng a profit for shareholders h;
the absence of :rnuJdple con..stitu0ncy representation, NCAA
decisionma.'l(:ing already induch:,'; a variety of perspectives and goal s, both
with in its membership and a,_mo:ng its various constituencies . As a result,
NCAA decisiorunald ng i:n some inst;:u.\C$0 :resembles a legisl ature rnore
than. a corporation.'B Stated d ifferently, tbe potential for cycl ing al ready
'

·----·- --- -·-- --~·-·-------

42.
Carney, supra note 4 1, at 420-22 . To appreciate how cycling can develop ,
consider a simplified group of decisionmake•·s that includes one individual representing
a member university, one representing women, and one representing student-athletes.
Their preferences v;~ith respect to three possible resolutions of a particular issue are as
follows:
Member University: A, B, C
Women:
B, C, A
Student-Athlete:
C, A, B
Given these preferences, if the representatives vote in accordance with their preferences,
none of the three outcomes can consistently defeat the other two in pairwise voting. Thus,
Member Uni•1ersity's flrst choice of A would defeat B (since Member University and
Student-Athlete both prefer A over B), but both Women and Student-Athlete prefer C to
A; yet B defeats C, and so on. One way to ensure a winning choice even where, as her.;;,
the parties' preferences are multi-peaked, is to adopt a procedural rule that prohibits the
decisiomnakers from reconsidering an alternati'Je thty have previously rejected. Thus,
if A is matched first against B, then against C, C w ill emerge as the winning choice. Yet
the outcome is arbitra:r;, since both :Member University and ·women prefer B to C, and
the decisionmakers might easily reverse this choice at their next meeting. The choice also
is subject to manipulation if one of the parties has agenda contro l. For an extensive
discussion of these issues, see i'viaxwdl L. Stearns, The iViisguided Renaissance of Social
Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994); Saul Levmore , Parliamentary Law, Majority
.Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. R EV. 971 (1989).
43.
This is particularly true given that the NCAA's member institutions vote on
much of its busi;1ess at the annual convention. On the other hand, the Presidents
Commission and the Council act somewhat like a board of directors, since the Presidents
Commission det.';nnine:s the order ir. which pmposals are voted on, see 1994-95 NCAA
Mr\NUAL art. 4 .5.3(e), the Council appoints many of the association's operating
committees , id. art. 4 .1.3(b), and both are within the limited group of decisionmakers
who have authority to initiate legislation. See, e.g., id. art. 5.3 .2.1 (only Presidents
Commission, Council, Division Steering Committee, group of eight or more members,
or a membe; confe rence may sponsor an amendment) .
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ex ists, and it is not clear how much s!:udent-athle·te representation would
exacerbate the problem.4<1
Cycling is not t:1e only concern, however. NCAA decisionmakers
might also agree to student-athlete representation but then effectively
marginalize the role of the representatives. 45 If the NCAA gave studentathletes a prescribed number of votes at lhe convention, for instance,
these votes would lose value if the association shifted much of its
decisionmaking authority to the comr11itte-~ that conduct NCAA business
between conventions .46
To the extent direct representation remains attractive despite these
concerns, add ition.81 questions rernain as to who student-athletes '
representatives might be a.n.d how u1ey should be seiected. Tne NCAA's
current approach to women's reoresentation
is simnlv., to set aside a
.
specified minin::um number of slots for representatives who are women,
without otherwise altering the seiection process. This strategy would not
work for student-athletes, given that student-athletes do not hold the kinds

.

44.
In the legislative context, the risk of cycling often is conteracted by vote
trading, or "logrolling. " That is, constituencies agree to vote for a measure they may not
support in return for votes in favor of a subsequent measure about which they feel
strongly. Thus, to return to the example in note 42, Student-Athlete might agree to
support B in return for Women 's promise to back a proposal of particular interest to
Student-Athlete. See, e.g., Steams, supra note 42, at 1278-79 nn.223-25 (discussing
logrolling). The large amount of discussion among members prior to and in connection
with the annual convention strongly suggests that NCAA members engage in logrolling.
Whether logrolling is desirable is debatable, of course, but it does reduce cycling.
Cycling also is less likely if some member institutions have disproportionate influence.
Members of high revenue conferences such as the Big Ten and Pacific Ten are widely
viewed as having particular influence due to the fear that they will simply secede from the
NCAA if they conclude that its regulations are excessive.
45.
This appears to have occurred during the attempts to reform the New York
Stock Exchange during the New Deal era. During William Douglas' term as chairman
of the SEC, the SEC pressured the New York Stock Exchange to alter its governing
structure in order to red uce the traditional dominance of floor traders. Although the
exchange agreed to include a substantial minority of non-floor trader members and nonmembers on the governing board, r1oor traders subsequently reasserted control by
arranging the delegation of important decisions to committees they controlled . See JoEL
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 166, 178, 324 (1982). Notice that
behavior of this sort can be seen as a particu larly malignar:t exercise of agenda control.
46.
The poss ibility of a shift in auth01;ty in the NCiu-\ is not at all hypothetical.
As noted earlier, the Presidents Commission did not even exist until the 1980s and was
initially seen as largely powerless . It has subsequently b;;.come a major force in NCAA
decisionmaking. See supra note 27. If student-athletes were represented on other
committees, but not on the Presidents Commission , they eould e,9.s ily lose much of their
leverage. Even if committees that lacked student-athlete participation did not arrogat::
additio nal authority , student-athletes ' inability to i..r1itiate legislation would significantly
limit their influence.
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of positions from whi ch NCAA representatives currently are chosen. 47
Should the NCAA decide to give student-at.t1letes representation, it thus
would face the difficult issue of deciding who should be el igible to vote:
al l students; all student-athletes; athletes at particular universities; student
body presidents; or some other defined group.
As noted earlier, some conferences al ready provide for student input
in conference decisionmaking. Big Ten universities generally select their
representatives through a campus-wide vote. This approach illustrates
some of the difficulties in assuring that student-athletes have meaningful
input. If the student chosen to represent t.~e university is not herself a
student- at.~lete, for instance, there is some question as to how effectively
she can speak for student-athletes; and, as discussed earlier, even studentathl etes have very different perspectives. The brevity of student-athletes'
presence further undermines the continuity of tl-}eir input. 48
Nevertheless, there is something to be said for giving students the
opportunity to speak for themselves about what they see as studentathletes' "interests." Simply having student-athletes present, as recent
reforms allow , may increase member institutions' incentive to focus on
student-athletes, but it significantly dilutes any benefits actual voting
authority might offer.
III.

INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: STUDENT-ATHLETES AND
FIDUCIARY DUTY LITIGATION

The approach discussed above, direct representation, can be seen as
an ex ante, or before-the-fact, strategy since it would assure studentathletes a say in the development and application of NCAA rules. This
Part considers whether the traditional ex post corporate law remedy, suing
the managers of an entity after t'1ey fail to live up to their fiduciary
duties, might be a means of enhancing student-athletes' influence in
NCAA decisionmaking.
The fiduciary duty approach can only come into play if NCAA and
university decisionmakers do in fact owe a fiduciary duty to student47.
For instance, the NCAA Manual defines "faculty athletics representative" as
"a member of an institution's faculty or administrative staff who is designated by the
institution's chief executive officer .. . to represent the institution." 1994-95 NCAA
M ANUAL art. 4.02.1 Student-athletes ordinarily do not meet this definition.
An obvious alternative would be to use ex-athletes or professional
48.
representatives. For a somewhat analogo us proposal in the corporate literature, see
Ronald J . Gilson & Reinier Kraakman , Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV . 863 (1991) . The chief limitations of this
approach would be the cost of engaging professionals and the possibility that outside
representatives of this sort wo uld only imperfectly share student-athletes' perspectives.

.
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athletes. I therefore begin this Part by discussing th -~ appropriate scope
of managers' fiduciary duties in the NCAA context. I then ask whether
student-athletes would have standing to enforce these duties; discuss the
procedural hurdles such a suit might face a.i1d ·whether the litigation would
prove effective; compare the fid uciary duty ap proach with a somewhat
analogous contract-based argument that a univers ity owes its studentathletes an implied duty of good fai t.."tt ; and, fin ally, address u1e practical
obstacles to th is approach .
A. Fiduciary Duty Standards in NCAA and University Decisionmaking

The initial issue considered in much of the literature on fiduciary
duties to nonprofits is how closely nonprofit duties should mirror for profit standards. Because of the traditional percepti on of nonprofits as
noncommercicJ and even charitable in nature, states at times have applied
di fferent fidu ciary standards to nonprofits. Nonprofit directors may be
hel d to a more ienient standard of care as a result!'9 On the other hand,
states have sometimes construed the duty of loyalty very strictly,
prohibiting any transaction between a director and the nonprofit on the
basis that it is particularly important to remove any hint of impropriety
in the nonprofit context. As several commentators have recently noted,
each of these deviations poses problems. Relaxing th.e duty of care
diminishes directorial accountability, and the heightened duty of loyalty
may chill even desirable transactions between a director and the nonprofit.
A better approach, and one that the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation
Act has largely adopted, is to apply similar standards to for-profit and
nonprofit directors. 50
Although the NCAA is an unincorporated nonprofit, similar
reasoning suggests, at least as a normative matter, that NCAA
decisionrnakers should also be hel d to for-profit standards in conducting

49.
See, e.g. , Henry Hansmann, The Evoiving Law of Nonprofit Organizations:
Do Current Trends i>'l ake Good Policy?, 39 CASE W. L. REV. 807 (1989). Some courts
and commentators have argued for a stricter duty of care, due to the absence of market
constraints on directorial decisionmaking in the nonprofit context. See Developments,
supra note 18, at 1602 (describing and rejecting this view).
50.
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § g .30 ( 1981); Developments, supra
note 18, at 1601-04. While the general for-profit fiduciarj duty standards are also
appropriate for nonprofits, for-profit standards arguably should not be imported wholesale
in all circumstances. See, e.g. , Deborah A. Del'vlott, Self-D ealing Transactior..s in
Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 131 (1 993) (arguing that proponents of a
self-dealing transaction i..·w olving charitable nonp ro fits should be required to prove
afflnnatively the transaction's fairness).
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business for or with the NCAA .51 This conclus ion speaks only to ilie
relative stringency of courts' scrutiny, however, and leaves several crucial
issues unresolved .
First, what would be the nature of NCAA
decisio nmakers ' duty? The NCAA' s articulated mission is to preserve
NCAA
and promote amateur athletics, <IS well as education.
decisionmakers' duty :must therefore include :an obligation to pursue lhese
objectives in a reasonably prudent manner.s 2
A second, and, fro m a student-athiete's perspective, particularly
important question, is whether NCAA decisionmakers owe a duty directly
to student-athletes, rather than solel y to the member institutions thai:
comprise the I'lCAA's primary constituency. Like the analogy between
co-representation <Lid student-athlete representation, the argument that
NCAA decision;·na..tcers owe a duty directly to student-athletes c!osely
parallels the arguments in the for-profh context for "other constitu-ency"
prov1s1ons, which requir~ directors to cons i de~: the interests of
nonsharehol der constituencies .53 Just as '"other constih!ency" statutes
requ ire (or invite) directors to deviate from their trad itional charge to
focus exclusively on shareholders, holding NCAA decisionmakers
accountable not just to their members but also to student-athletes could be
seen as an expansion of their existing duties .

51.
Giveo that many universities are nonprofit corporations, the nonprofit analysis
in the preceding text applies directly to university decisionmalcers . While my initial focus
is on a duty owed by NCAA decisionmakers to student-athletes, I argue below that a
member university should also have a duty to its student-athletes .
52.
Which NCAA dec isionmaking bodies should be subject to the duty, and
whether the duty should vary among decisionmaking bodies, are add itional iss ues to
consider. For instance, it seems clear that members of the Presidents Council should be
subject to a duty, but attributing a duty to each member represented at the annual
convention is more problematic as a conceptual matter.
An additional question is whether NC AA decisionmakers ' fiduciary duties also
should apply to operating level actions such as a decis ioo by the In fractions Committee
to impose sanctions on a member institution or its athletes . For the d uty to be fully
e ffective, it would need to apply to individual infractions deci:.ions as well as to the
decision whether to implement a particular rule.
53.
The call for holding directors respons ible to a broad array of constituencies,
rather than so lely to shareholde rs, dates back at !east to Dodd's debate w ith Berle. See
supra note 6. The argument has gained particular force in recent years in the wal\:e of the
takeover wave of the 1980s, as a response to the da maging effect takeovers are thought
to have on nonshareholder constituencies. Twenty-eight states have now adopted statutes
that eithe r pennit or require for-p rofit directors to take sta.l<eholders' (that is,
constituencies other than shareholders) interests into accoun t. Lawrence E. M itche ll , A
Theoretical and Practical Frameworkfor Enforcing Cm porate Constituency Statutzs , 70
TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992) (defe nding the statutes). For a criticism of these statutes, see
Carney, supra note 41.
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Despite the fac t that studem-at.h!ett'-S do not on initial inspection
appear to be 1}ne r-JCAA's principal constituency, tbe case for a duty to
student- athlet~'l ls particularly attractive. Whereas for-pro fit corporations
have traditiotlBJ ly owed feaJty , at least in theDry, solely to their
shareholders , tb,: r"TCAA 's mission as protector oi arnateur athletics
already extends b~yond its members' pc:xochial concerns to encompass the
.
'
- 1
1
mterests
or~ si:I.K!c::r:rH-.t)'1.ete.s,
as mseusseo
ear 1'wr.-'4
As \vith the duty of care !:n the for-pro fit context, ·t_,'-}~~ most ifltractable
limitation Oil loo~z1ng (J 'NC.AA d-edsio:r.mal:cers' f1ch1d 2.ry dutie~ as a
'
•'
rl
' l
•
th at courts are poor.y
1 S!tuateu
.
.J
source ot' pmt~:-e:uoo.
·ror
snk.ent-aJ.n;etes
1s
to second-guess NCAA d ~cisionm aki:ng . Courts c:rre :not any more expert
in evaluating ~_l~t ~ effec1.s of a ~gi ven ~iC ,~ i\ rule on studenc-athleres and
amateur ar..hl stks than they are 'Hith respect to mor .~; traditional business
deciSiODS. 55 lrt r;on.sequence, the broad deference extended tO directors'
decisiomnakillg purs<.E;,nt to the business judgment :ru J ,~ in L~e for-profit
context secrns at l~.ast 2t i1rst glance., to be sirxlil ~3J'l y appropriate for
NCAA decislonmaking. 56
Given the need to defer to NCAA expertise, and the uncertainty as
to what student-athletes' interests are, the fiduciary duty approach is
subject to appreciable limitations. But a strong case can be made that
NCAA decisionmakers should and do in fact owe such a duty to their
student-athletes . I will return to uie question whether fiduciary duty is
likely to be an effective protection for student-athletes below, but first I
consider sever.oJ procedural issues .
>

•

1

B. Wou ld Stwlen.t-Athletes Have Standing to Sue?

Just as import&llt as w.~e issue of what an NCAA or member
institution decisionrnaker's fi duciary duty would entail is the related
question whether student-athletes would have standing to enforce the duty.
In addressing this issue, it is useful to begin by focusing on fiduciary duty
claims student-athietes might make against NCAA decisionmakers, and
54.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Student-athletes' relative inability
to protect themselves by contract further reinforces the case for fiduciary duty protection .
The argument that university decisionmakers owe their student-athletes a fiduciary duty
is potentially everr stronger, since students are a principal constituency of Lheir
universities. Sez iPfw. part IH.B.
55.
in a r;~_se ll'!olving the closely related issue of r~u irements for participating
in the Olympics , Judge Posner wrote a separate concurrence solely to underscore courts'
laclc of expertis-e i11 millci•1g decisions about amateur athletics. Michels v. United States
Olympic Comm. , 741 f' .2d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner , J. , concurring).
56.
For a classic example of courts' deference under the business judgment rule,
see Shlensky v. 'Wrigley, 237 N .E.2d 776 (1U. 1968) (rejecting challenge to directors'
decision not to hold night games at vVrigley Field baseball park).
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then to turn to the suits a student-athl ete might bring against her own

university.
For many nonprofit corporations, th;;; issue of standing has proven
particularly troublesome due to L*1e abs.rmce of shareholders or an
analogous constituency mat is di:rectiy harmed by directorial breach. The
states' usual response has be.:;D. to ves~: stmding in the state attorney
general, but Lj..lis is at most a second-best solution due to resource
constraints and other limitations on attomey ge11erals' effectiveness. 57
The stzmding issue is less problernatic as a conceptual Inatter for a
member-run organization like L~e NCAA. 1Viuch like tlle shareholders of
a for-profit corporation, 1::.~e members of th:::; 1\IClhA benefit or suffer most
directly fwm NCAA decisions; as a. re.:s ult, t1i•;;;y are the obvious choice
to bring suit in the event of a breach >' 8 T hus, as a general matter, it
appears that t.l-:le NCAA's members rather than anyone else should have
standing to enforce any breach of NCAA decisionmllicers' duties of care
and loyaJty. 59
Whether vesting standing in. the member institutions also makes sense
when the alleged breach relates to student-athletes is a more difficult
question, however. Members often have very different incentives from
a student-athlete. If a student-athlete wished to challenge the NCAA's
limits on compensation, for instance, her university would have little
incentive to defend her cause, because an increase in compensation would
mean higher costs for the university. Moreover, even if the university
were sympathetic to an athlete's grievance, it mi ght refuse to pursue the

57.
See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 50, at 145; Developments, supra note 18, at
1605-06.
58.
Consistent with this notion, some states give members of a nonprofit
corporation derivative standing either by statute or by common law. N.Y. NoT-FORPROFIT CORP. LAW§ 623 (Consol. 1990 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-56-401
(1994); Developments, supra note 18, at 1605.
59.
The derivative provision in the NCAA's home state of Kansas explicitly
contemplates the possibility of suit by the members of an unincorporated association, see
KAN. STAT. ;.\NN. § 60-223a (1994), suggesting that the NCAA's members do in fact
have standing to sue. The issue of standing becomes somewhat less clear on inspection,
however, at least for suits that are derivative rather than direct, as discussed in more
detail below. See ir:fra note 83 and accompanying text.
In addition to its explicit inclusion of members of an unirJCorporated association, the
Kansas provision also is significant in that, unlike many provis ions applicable to nonprofit
corporations, it does not impose the additional prerequisite that a minimum percentage of
members join any derivative suit. See, e.g., N .Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 623
(Consoi. 1990 & Supp. 1995) (minimum of five percent of members). Because each
member instiiution has a significant stake in the NC~\A's actions, despite compruing
much less than one percent of NCAA membership, and given the reluctance many
institutions will have to join a challenge to NCAi'>. decisionmaking, members should be
entitled to initiate fiduciary duty litigation individually.
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claim for fear that chall:;mging NCAA aull1ority would invite
retaliation. 60
An obvious alternative to member-initiated litigation is allowing
student-athletes to file suit if NCAA decisiorunakers appear to have
neglected their interests . \Vhet..1er courts would in fact recognize studentCourts have often been
athlete standing is unclear, however.
extraordinarily reluctant to permit additional constituencies to enforce
directorial duties on behalf of both for--profit and nonprofit
corporations. 6 1 Yet the arguments for student-athlete sta.t1d ing are quite
powerful. 62 l'vioreover, if the student-athlete's claim is against her

60.
The NCAA has in fact shown a willingness to retaliate. When a group of
prominent schools challenged the NCAA hegemony over co liege footbaLl television rights,
the l'·l CA.D,. made clear that it wo uld discipline any member S·c hool that recognized their
television contract. The rebelling schools proved successful only when the Supreme Court
held that the NCAA's actions vioiated the antitrust laws. NCAA v. Board of Regents,
468 U .S. 85, 95, 120 (1984).
The confEcts of interest between a student-athlete and her university are analogous
in interesting respects to those arising in connection with for-profit directors' general duty
to act lawfully. Although for-profit directors are subject to a fiduciary duty suit if they
cause the corporation to break a law, shareholders may be better off looking the other
way, since the improper behavior may actually benefit the corporation fmancially and,
even if it does not, calling attention to the problem could prove costly for the finn. See,
e.g., Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the General Law
Compliance Obligation in Section 2. OJ (a) of the American Law Institute's Principles of
Corporate Governance, 66 WASH . L. REV. 413 (1991).
See, e. g. , O'Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398 (Md. 1994) (subscribers to
61.
health services insurance plans denied standing to sue former officers and directors);
DeMott, supra note 50, at 145 (noting that standing 'Nith respect to charitable nonprofits
often is limited to state attorneys general and the co rporation). In the for-profit context,
courts' general unwillingness to expand standing is re flected by their hostility towards
bondholders' efforts to sue on fiduciary duty grounds. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549
A.2d 300 (Del. 1988) (no fiducia ry duty owed to ho lders of convertible debentures); see
also Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduc iary Duty upon Corporate insolvency: Proper Scope of
Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAJ'iD. L. REv. 1485 (1993) (arguing that, while
directors are said to owe a fiduciary duty to creditors when a corporation becomes
insolvent, most of the cases involve fraudulent conveyances or preferences rather than true
fiduciary duty issues). One of the striking cha racteristics of the new "other constituency"
statutes that purport to expand directors ' duties is that they almost never authorize
nonshareholder constituencies to s ue. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717
(Purdon 1990 & Supp. 1993).
62.
One case involving an antitrust challenge to the NCAA's imposition of
sanctions on a college football program offers a tantalizing glimpse at the issue.
McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988). In McCormack, the Fifth Circuit
rej ected the plaintiffs' attempt to characterize their suit as a derivative action brought
against the NCAA on behalf of their univers ity, due to the plaintiffs' failure to show that
they had complied with the procw ural prerequisites to derivative litigation. ld. at 1341.
The court seems to have left open the possibility that student-athletes who do jump
th ro ugh the appropriate hoops could sue derivatively, although the court expressed doubts
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university rathe:r than against NCAA dP.-eisionrna..~ers , the argument for
vesting standing h1 the student-athlete is even stronger. Although the
rel ationship between student-athletes a..11d a university is not a,;; direct as
that of shareho!den; to a for-pro n fi rm, or members to a mut11al benefit,
students have ii'"le kind of disctete financial st.a.cxe in a university that
justifies giving them sta.11ding tO <::nforce university decisioruna.\:ers'
fiduciary dutie.s. Some courts have based student standing to s:u.e
universities on this tbeory. 63
Even more than in other ;-;ontexts, comts' tre.atm:mt of tJ1e standing
issue seems likely to turn on th~ir condusio11 as to wh BL~ er NC~Ai\ 2:.nd
university decisiomnakers mve a fiducimy du ty to student-ar.hl etes.
Because student-au1letes' gdevamccs tend to i.Iwolve mistre2.tment sp0cific
to student-athletes rather than dahns of general misrnanagement, courts
u'lat recognize a duty to student-athletes would probably also grant
student-athletes standing to enforce it.
In his paper ior th is conference, Professor Remington argttes iliat
student-athl etes should negotiate explicit contractual protections during the
recruiting process, and that universities should in tum offer express
contractual protections to their recruits . For instance, a university might
promise to extend the student-athlete' s scholarship in the event her athletic
eligibility expires, or to finance attendance of SUllli11e r school. 64 One
effect of focusing on the contractual nature of the student--athlete's
relationship with her university is that it underscores both the role of
fiduciary duty and the arguments I have just made for giving studentathletes standing.
The issue of student-atllletes' ability to contract with a university
raises two rel ated concerns. First, even when the parties have equal
bargaining power, if the relationship is complex , t..hey often will fail to
specify all the terms of their contract. One can easil y imagine studentathletes failing to insist that surnr:ner school tuition be included ln theif
scholarships, for instance. Second, al l except the most highly sought after
stadent-athletes are at a significant bargaining disadvantage as compared
to a university .
as to whether students have standing vis-a-vis their university.
63.
See, e.g., Jones v . Grant, 344 So . 2d 1210 (Ala. 1977) (students and facu lty
have standing to bring class action against trustees); Montclair Nat '! Bank & Trust Co.
v. Seton Hall College, 217 A.2d 897 (N .J . Super . Ct. Ch . Div. 1966) (students have
standing to sue); see also Developments, S'Apra note 18, at 1606. The most impo rt.ant
obstacle to standing in many of these cases is 5tate statutOliJ law sug;sesting that only th·t:
attorney general has authority to bring su it against the tmstees of a charitable
organization. By allowing student-athletes to sue, the courts would effe.::tivdy expand the
standing provision .
64.
Remington, S !lpra note 36, at 768 .
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Fiduciary duty is a clCJ.ssic response to each of these probl ems.
According to one view of fi duciary duty, its pri ncipal role in th e
corporate law context is to fi ll in terms that the parties have omitted from
their contract. 65 A very different view suggests that fi duciary duties
should be imposed when the parties have unequal bargaining power or
lack an arm's length relationsh ip. 66
Ch aracterizing fid uciary duty in th is way strongl y reinforces the case
for recognizing student-athletes' standing . '\11fn ether one sees fid uciary
duty as mechanism for filling gaps in the studenHtthlete' s contract, or as
an obligation university or NCAA decisionmakers owe based on th e
natu re of their relationship wiL-, student-ati.letes, the duty ru ns d irectly to
student-athl etes and can be seen as quasi-contractual ir.. character. From
this perspective, student-athl etes are precisely the parties who should have
standing to enforce such a duty.

C. The Procedural Prerequisites for Bringing Fiduciary Duty Litigation
Having suggested that NCAA and university decisionmakers may
owe a fiduciary duty that student-athletes should have standing to enforce,
I now consider the procedural requirements a student-athlete must satisfy
in order to enforce the duty. The key threshold issue is whether the suit
is derivative or direct. Corporate law defines a shareholder's suit as
derivative if the harm in question runs to the corporation as a whole, as
occurs when the directors of a firm mismanage its assets. 67 If the suit
is derivative, the shareholder must first demand that the corporation bring
the suit, or al lege that demand is excused, since techni cal ly it is the
corporation that has been harmed .68 A sh areholder who is harmed
directly, on the other hand , can sue without fi rst cl earing these procedural
hurdles.

65.

See, e.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. F ISCHEL, T HE ECONOMlC

S TRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 92 (1991).

66 .
Lawrence Mitchell has argued, based on this perspective , that managers
should owe a fiduciary duty to bondho lders in the for-p rofit context, in part because
bondholders are not represented in the negotiation process. Lawrence E. Mitchell , The
Fairn ess Rights ojCorporate Bondholders, 65 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1165 , 1177-8 6 (1990) .
67.
Harm to the corporation obviously impacts its shareho lders, but a
shareholder' s injury is derivative, or ind irect, to the extent that it principatly stems from
her proportionate interest in the corporation' s loss in value d ue to directorial
mismanagement o t related problems. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. A LEXANDER, LAWS
OF CO RPO RATIONS§ 360, at 1047-53 (3d ed . 1983).
68.
Some states impose additional prerequisites to derivative litigation , such as
requiring plaintiffs to post security fo r expenses . See, e.g. , N. Y . Bu:.; . C ORP. LAW§ 627
(McKinney 1986).
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A student-aG1lete who wishes to enfo t c1:~ a fiduciary duty rnight often
be abie to characterize her suit as dirE:ct zmd tlms avo id t..lJ e procedural
obstacies to suing derivatively. A :3tuder;i·-athiete whose eligibility has
been restricted by the NCAA or who.:.e university refuses to finance
summer school, for instance, has suffer•::d an injury L'l-Jat is direct rather
than common to all student-atJil etes. Articulating the claim in quasicontractual terms-as arising out of the s ttdent-at:1 1ete's contract wit.h the
NCAA or her l..miversity-rei:nforc::-;s the ~:rgument that the student has
suffered an injury specific to herself IT:
one could argue that nearly
every claim involving NClu\ or 1.m iv0rs\t y decisionma.l<ers ' treatment of
a student-athlete would be direct; ooJy 1£' Cc1e student-athlete sought to
allege general mismanagemeDt oi' r+-~ l./~ ;) ; rmiversity zssBts would her
claim qualify as derivati'!e. 69
However, some student-athl ete ei~. ~:dle:ng es to i<ICAA action might be
at least partially derivative in nat:;.u ;;. T'h;; f',JCAA's proh ibition on
compensating student-athlet.es is a good example. 11lis restriction
arguably affects al l (or at least a wide range ot) student-athletes, so that
a challenge to the restriction as violating tbe NCAA's duty to studentathletes may be characterized as derivative .
In the corporate context, derivative litigation raises a problem that
would prove similarly vexing if a student-athlete's suit against NCAA or
university decisionmak:ers were found to be derivative: th e directors of a
corporation are the actors who will respond to a shareholder's demand,
and thus will decide whether to pursue or terminate the suit; yet their
motives are questionable given that they usual ly are the subjects of the
suit. 70 Even if the board of directors del egates the decision to a special
litigation committee limited to directors 'Nho are not implicated in the
suit, the committee is likely to be sympaL'letk to the defendant directors.
As a result, the directors may not only weed out frivolous suits, but also

69 .
This contention is arguably consistent with the distinctions courts draw in the
for-profit context. While it is difficult to generalize about the cases, courts generally
characterize allegations that the behavior in question has impaired a shareholder's voting
or dividend rights as direct rather than derivative, even if all shareholders suffer a similar
injury. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 67, § 360, at 1048-49. One can argue, by
analogy, that each student-athlete suffers a di.rect injury to her status as a student-athlete
when the NCAA imposes regulations thai. adversely affect a wide range of studentathletes.
70.
The literature on this and other c:leJivative issues discussed below is extensive.
John Coffee was the flrst to explore many of the issues in a series o f classic articles. See,
e.g. , Jo hn C . Coffee, Jr ., Understo.n.ding the l 'laini'if.f's A!tomey: The lmplicatioi'.s of
Economic Theory fo r PrivtJU Enforcement ojLaw Thm;t.gh Class and Derivative ActiortS,
86 COLUM. L. REv . &59 (1986); John C . Coff.:'-e, Jr., The Ur!faithjul Champion.: The
Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareho!d::r Litigatio;1, LAW ,£{ CO!'HFJ'v!P. PrtaBS., Summer 1985,
at 5.
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terminate potentially meritorious claims . One suspects t.'1at NCAA or
university decis ionmakers would be similarly unsympathetic to litigation
brought by a student-athlete. 71
As an alternative to special comrnittees made up of "independent"'
directors (i.e. , directors not narned .as defendB.nts) , commentators have
suggested uiat a better approach in t.~ e for-profh context m ight be to
authorize eith·er court-appointed experts or a group of substantial
shareholders to detennine whet.'ier a c:orpor8tion should pursue
litigation. 72 Of the two approaches , using court-appointed experts seems
more attractive for derivative litigation involving the NCAA, and may in
fact offer real promise in this context. 73 A.s noted abovB, corr1111entators
have criticized \--Ourt-appointe<i experts as being i:nsufnciently focused on
shareholders' interest in maximizing pwfits given that dw experts are not
themselves shan~hold ers . In liti.gatlm) involvi ng student .. athletes and the
NCAA , by contrMt, a committ:;;e •.vhh lliil h11.::entive J:o focus solely on the
NCAA' s bottom line would be misplaced . Given th e NCAA's explicit
commitment to stud ent-athletes, 74 and th e multiplicity of its other
objectives, outside experts (such as fo rmer student-athletes) might be at
least as capable of evaluating a complaint as representatives of member
institutions or NCAA decisionmakers , yet not so hampered by conflicting
incentives.

71.
Another problem that would arise if a suit agaii1st NCAA decisionmakers were
characterized as derivative is the uncertainty of whether the NCAA, because it is an
unincorporated association, could be sued derivatively under Kansas law. See supra note
16; infra note 83. This uncertainty reinforces the value of suing dire<:tly rather than in
a derivative capacity.
72.
Both would ensure a less interested decisionmaker, but each also has
signiticant downsides . The prob lem with shareholders' committees is that a firm's largest
shareholders may be unwilling to serve due to inconvenience and the effect committee
membership would have on their ability to buy and sell th;:: firm' s stock. Court-appointed
experts are more willing to serve but, because they lack a fmancial interest in the ftnn,
may not be as effective in ad vocating shareho lders' best i11terests as would someone who
shares those interests . For a thoughtful discussion of both approaches, and a tentative
suggestion that shareholders' committees might improve on the existing regime, see
Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of lns tilUtional Shareholder
Activism, 79 GEO. L. REv. 445 (1991); see also Frank lin A. Gevurtz, Who Represents
the Corporation: In Search of a Beller Method for Determining the Corporate Interest in
Derivative Suits, 46 U , PriT. L P.E V . 265, 321-25 (1 985) (arguing for court-appointed
litigation panel) .
The most obvious analogue to a 3hareholders' committee for suits involving
73.
the NCA/1. vvouid be a commiUee comprised of representatives of seven member
i.r1stitutions. Such a committee ra ises conc;~ms about its member s' in coentives, which may
include !! competitive i;1terest i.n the p•jnishment o f another memb·er or , on the other hand ,
the fear of futu re NCAA scrutiny of their own athletics depa rtment.
74.
See sHpra note 34 and acco mpanying text.
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This approach would obviously add to the cost of the der ivative
strategy, but it would give student-athletes the benefit of a disinterested
decis ionma.ker in the event tn'1eir suits were defined as derivative.

D. Fiduciary Duty in Action: Its Promise and Limit.:ltfcr.s
! have argt!ed that none of the most immediate obstacles to a
fiduciary duty approach is insuperable. An important question that still
remains , and to which I now return, is whether this approach would
effect iv.e! y protect studenHJ.thletes.
I have already noted an important limitation on fiduciary duty
litigation: because cour!.S are poorly situated to second-guess NCAA
decisionmaki ng , they ~Jmost certainly would defer in many situations to
NCAA and university decisiorunakers' substantive decisions, much as they
do in duty-of-care corporate law cases. 75 Yet the likely extent of judicial
deference should not be overstated . First, even in duty-of-care cases,
courts can provide meaningful scrutiny of the decisionmaking process and
may strike down a decision if the procedures that led to it were flawed. 76
Second, many and perhaps most of the suits brought by student-athletes
would resembl e duty of loyalty rather than duty-of-care suits, given the
conflicts of interest created by NCAA and university decisionmakers'
financi al interest in limiting student-athlete compensation and mobility. 77
Courts' willingness to play an active role in cases involving a conflict of
interest suggests that fid uci ary duty theories could offer meaningful
protection for some student-athletes .
To appreciate how the fiduciary duty app roach might work, consider
an illustration . Suppose th at a men' s footbal l player who has completed

75 .
Courts already have afforded broad deference to schools and other educational
organizations sued on educational malpractice and related grounds. See, e.g., Ross v.
Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 , 414-15 (7th C ir. 1992) (describing reasons for deference
and citing cases). It is important to keep in mind, however, that the relationship between
a student-athlete and a university is very different from the relationship between a nonathlete student and the university, given the univers ity's close control over studentathletes' lives and the fmancial benefits some student-athletes bring to the university . See
University of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 629 (Colo. 1993) (describing extent of
university regu lation of student-athletes' lives).
For prominent recent examples irl the for-profit context, see CEDE & Co. v.
76.
Technico lo r, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (directors exercised inadequate care in
approving merger); Smith v. Van Gorkom , 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (same).
77.
Delaware courts have applied enhanced scrutiny of for-profit corp<Jration
takeovers when directors have a conflict of interest but have not engaged in classic selfdealing. See , e.g. , Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d
34 (Del. 1994). A somewhat similar level of review-Qne which at a minimum entails
a searching scrutiny of the decisionmaking process- would be appropriate in the NCAA
and member institution context.
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his athletic eligib ility needs one more year to complete his degree, but his
university refuses to extend his scholarsh ip for the final year. Using a
fiduciary duty approach , the student-at~lete might allege that the
university ' s refusal to extend his scholarsh ip con.stitt1tes a breach of duty,
and ask that th0 court issue injunctive relief requiring the university to
finance his tin- . year. ln making his case, the student might point out
that the NCAA constitution emphasizes NCAA (and by implication,
1•
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One caveat is in order: the parameters of the fidu ciary duty
necessarily would vary depending on the student-athlete and sport in
question . Signifkantly different expectations are created in different
contexts-the most obvious disparity in expectations appearing between
revenue-producing sports and other sport_s. These differences highlight
the intriguing parall els between a fiduciary duty theory and a studentathlete' s contract-based arguments that the university owes her an implied
duty of good faith. In a much-cited recent case invol ving a Creighton
University basketball player, the Seventh Circuit suggested that a
university did in fact owe such a duty, at least to the extent it had made
express promises to the student-athlete.79 In the example discussed
above, this approach might, like fiduciary duty, be a basis for liability if
1
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78 .
At the univers ity level, courts have held that the letter o f intent and related
documents create a conti'actual relationship between the student-athlete and the university .
Ross, 957 F.2d at •HO; Colorado Seminary v . NCAA, 570 F.2d 320 (lOth Cir. 1978); see
Michad J. Cozzillio , The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Leiter of Intent:
A Contract by Any Other JVar~~e, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1275 (1989).
79.
Ross, 957 F.2d at 41 7 (rejecting negligence claims such as educational
malpractice, but concluding t}mt Illinois wo uld recognize a claim based on express
promise) . T im Davis has expiored and argued for the implied CDntract duty approach in
several recent article>. Timothy Davis, Student-Athlete Prospective &onomic Interests:
Contractual Dimensions, 19 T. MARS!--I.ALL L. REv. 585 (1994); Timothy Davis,
Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities, 25 R UTGERS LJ.
269 (1994) (hereinafter Davis, lil!ercollegia:e Athletics]; see also Harold B. Hilborn,
Comment, Swdent-Athlet::s end Judiciallncons istency: Establishing a Duty to Educate as
a !Weans of Fostering M.za;;ingfi;l R.ejorr;1 of Intercollegiate Athletes, 89 Nw. L. REv. 741
(1 995) (arg uing for contractu!l.] duty or, ti1 the alternative , that student-athletes be given
full employment b;onefits).
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the university had made express promise-s to h'le football player
concerning its financial com..rnitment to his education.
In fact, the contract-based duty of good faiu'1 and fi duciary duty seem
likely to lead to similar analyses in a wide range of cases. 00 There are,
however, several important differences between them. One advantage of
implied contract is that it would entail few er procedural uncertainties,
such as the stand ing issues discussed earlier. On the ot~er hand, fiduciary
duty does not require the university to have made &'1 express promise, and
it can be used to scrutinize the university's decisionmaking process, rather
than just the substance of its actions.
Tne fiduciary duty approach also seems far more promising if the
student-athlete's grievance is against NCAA decis ionmakers rather than
her university, given th at the NCAA doe.s not have a direct contractual
relationship with student-athletes. To appreciate how the fiduciary duty
example might play out with respect to the NCAA, consider another
example. Suppose the Presidents Cormnission drafted and sponsored
legislation prohibiting universities from paying student-athletes a stipend
to encourage them to attend surnmer school, and the legisl ation was
passed at the annual convention . A student-athl ete could attempt to show
flaws in the decisionmaking process, such as the Commission's failure to
consider evidence suggesting that revenue sports athletes cannot
realistically graduate unless they attend summer school and that the
graduation rate for these athletes is far lower than for other students (and
perhaps student-athletes). The student-au1lete might also focus on any
obvious conflicts of interest that might have skewed the Presidents
Commission' s decisionmaking process, and argue that the process was
flawed as a result.
In contrast to negative forms of scrutiny such as antitrust review,
fiduciary duty litigation might even help to create and clarify the
affirmative obligations universities and the NCAA owe to studentathletes. 81 For instance, even if many of the suits proved unsuccessful

80.
The same is true in the for-profit co ntext. Bondholders whose contracts fail
to protect them against adverse developments have attempted to advance both fiduciary
duty and implied contractual duty arguments. See Marcel Ka han, The Qualified Case
AgaiTLSt Mandatory Tenns in Bonds , 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 565, 587 (1995) (citing cases).
81 .
Peter Carstensen and Paul 0 lszowka argue that N C/>.A regulation should take
place at the national level due to the "home court adw.ntage " concerns that can undermine
state decisionmaking. Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, StudentAthletes and the NCAA: Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private &onomic Regulation,
1995 WIS. L REv. 545, 560. These concerns are far less serious with respect to judicial
review of fiduciary duty claims than in other contexts. Under ordinary conlict-of-law
principles, or by analogy to the internal affairs doctrine in for-profit corporate law, courts
would apply Kansas law in cases involving NCAJ.\. decisionmakers given that the NCAA
is located in Kansas . Litigation against university decisionmakers would be decided by
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on the merits, fiduciary duty challenges might force NCA.J·\ a.11d university
decisionmaken; to articulate more clearly how they view their educational
and athletic responsibilities to student~ath letes.
It is importallt not to overstate u'1e likel y effectiveness of a fiduciary
duty approach. As notE--d earlier, because courts are poorly situated to
second-guess NCAA ancl university decisionrnakers, they would often
defer to NCAA and university exp,;rtise. Nevert.l-J.e1ess, fiduciary duty
suits could offer a slgnificank additiom>J protection to student-athletes .
E. Why Haw~ We So Rarely Seen the Fiducimy l)ury Approach in
.r:4ction?

The suggestion that fiduciary duty 1itiga.tion may irnprove on existing
legal strategies for stnder:t-athletes , and thus tl:wt this corporate law
perspective offers a welcome 2-.ddition to student-athletes' existing legal
protections, raises an obvious question: why have litigants suing the
NCAA so rarel y invoked this device in the past? Wh y do they routinely
look to constitutional law , a.ntitrust, or their state legislatures instead?
One possibility is that , even in the absence of any practical obstacles
to suing on fiduciary duty grounds, these suits would not be effective
because of limitations such as courts' likely deference to NCAA
decisionrnaking and the possibil ity courts would conclude that NCAA and
university decisionmakers simply do not owe an enforceable duty to
student-athletes. Yet, the concern over a relatively low probability of
success seems an incomplete explanation of the dearth of fiduciary duty
suits against the NCAA , and I have suggested several contexts where the
approach might prove effective. 82
The NCAA 's unincorporated status creates additional uncertainties.
As discussed in Pait I, unincorporated associations are not legal entities.
Because of this, and because derivative litigation involves state rather than
federal law, the NCAA could not be sued derivatively unless a state

courts in the university's state, but both the student-athlete and the university would, in
a sense , hail from that state . As a result, judges and juries would seem as likely to
identify with even an out-of-state student-athlete as with university decisionmakers .
Moreover, while state-by-state case law arguably co uld create problems such as a lack of
uniformity, this has not been a major problem in other co rporate contexts; and federal
courts applying a fed eral law do not always pwvide uniform decisions, as the antitrust
cases themselves make clear .
Because derivative plaintiffs are ordinarily requ ired first to demand that a
82.
corporation (or in this case, association) pursue the Litigation before pursuing it
themselves, the possible time delay might be seen as a disincentive to suing derivatively.
But plaintiffs have been able to ~ ue immediately in the corporate context by alleging that
demand is unnecessary because futile. ]Viore.over, the problem arises only if the studentathlete ca11not characterize her cause of action as direct rather thfiil derivative.
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Yet, as noted earlier, student-athletes cou ld avoid th is uncertaint:," by
characterizing their suits as d irect rather than derivative, and emphasizing
the quasi-contractual nature of the claim.
Anolher possibility , of course, is that lawyers :have not yet thought
j
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to focus on fid uciary duty. The one remaini.ng obstac1 e is basic, bJ..ri may
also be particularly impor&:tnt: the fiduciary duty approach \vould funct ion
effectively only if snldent-att1ietes were able to obt2in lawyers. I\t~ost
student-achletes C2J1not afford to pay l~rwyers themselves. \Vb il~ the
obvious alternative in such a situation L for attorneys to taJc;; promi:)ing
cases on :;;ontingency as they do in the for-pro fit context, 1!:1e contingency
approach rnight not work for student-ati1bte,s' suits . .h1 contr21..st to
corporate derivative Htiga;lts, ,,;vho frequently se;::~ :~ monetJxy damages,
student-athl-etes VJOJJid frequently be se-ekh1g inj;.Flcti'ie relief and would
often have extr;:;ordinary difficulty proving :m.onc;;tai"y darnages.
Yet student-athletes' inability to obtain representation should not be
overstated . First, some cases do involve or could be framed in terms of
read ily ascertainable dollai amounts, such as the cost of a final yeas of
education u'1 at a university refuses to finance after an athlete' s eligibility
expires . Second , student-athletes could bring some .suits as class actions
(for instance, a challenge to an NCAA eligibility mle) and argue for
attorneys fees in connection witt'! a settlement or successful verd ict.
Final ly, some student-athletes can affo rd representation, and other cases
may be particularly good candidates for pro bono representation. The
attorneys fees concern could be easily addressed through legislation
requir ing the NCAA and member institutio ns to pay successful plaintiffs'
attorneys fees . But even in the absence of such a step , t11e fiduciary duty
approach appears to offer promise.

83 .
Interestingly, Kansas, the NCAA.'s home state, appears to co ntemplate that
derivative litigation may be brought against a Kansas association Section 60-223a of the
Kansas statutes, which sets forth the requirements for suing derivatively, refers to a
"derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a right of
a corporation or of an unincorporated association." KAN . STAT. ANN . § 60-223a (1994)
(e mphasis added) . Yet it is unclear vvhether the provision i.;l question qualifies as an
enab ling statute affirmatively autho rizing derivative litigation i..-r-;olving the NCAA. The
Supreme Court of Kansas, for instance, construed KAN. STAT. ANN . § 60-223a q uite
narrow ly in Kansas Private Club A.ss'n v . Londerholm , 402 P .2d 891 (Kan . 1965),
rejecting arguments that it gives an association the authority i.o sue on beha lf of its
members. See also ?v1 urray v . Sevier, 156 f.R.D . 235, 242 (D. Ka:n . 1994) (noting, i..r1
a case decided under Alabama law , that § 60-223 has been construed as not crcati..-lg a
right to s ue or be sued in association name).

IV .

697

Perspectives on Stw}rertt-Athletes

1995:669

.EXTERl'l!V~ CORPOfVHE GOVERJ'\JANCE l3SUES : THE

NCAA

AS A

SELF-REGULATING 0RGANEAT10N

·rile previous Parts considered whether ii1~er.na1 corporate governance
mechanisnns might give student-athletes a gre.a-i:er voice in and protection
with respect to NCAA and member institution decisiom:naking . I shift in
this Par-i: from a discussion of internal governanc,e to a consideration of
'he role that a more dramatic approach, e- i:ern~iJ oversight, might play in
a dr~ssing concems of student-athletes.
'fbe antitmsi: laws provide one possible source of external oversight.
Students and universities have al ready used a ntitrust 1aw in several highprofile case,s against the NCAA, 34 a.Gd P et~r Carstensen and Paul
Olszowka defend ii: in their artici e for Vh1s syrnposiuxn as the most
., l e mecn:o:msm wr
~
j
•
"'T' -.,
pl ausw
regu,atmg
hil..I'""P'
?\C:tlVlUes :gj i] Wh'll retum to
ts'le ro le of antitmst later in this Part.
But ::u1titrust is not the only possible sou:rc ~ of external review of the
NCAA. This Part examines the possibility of adopting a framework
derived from the structure currently used to regu late the stock exchanges.
This structure, \-vhich was first implemented pursuant to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 86 grants the Securities Exchange Commission
extensive authority to regulate the exchanges, but leaves much regulation
to the exchanges tt'lemselves. Consistent with their largely autonomous
role, the exchanges are registered as "Self Regulatory Organizations"
under the 1934 Act. 87
I argrw in this Part that a similar arrangement, coupling government
regulation with a relatively hands-off approach to day-to-day governance,
might also make sense for the NCAA. The analysis wili suggest that
securities-style regulation offers important adva\1tages over bou'l the
internal corporate governance mechanisms previously discussed an.d the
antitrust approach. The most obvious limitation of such an approach is
the significant reform it would entail .
The Part begins by describing the regulatory framework used to
oversee the exchanges, and detail s a few similarities between the NCAA
and an exchange. I then consider how securities-styl e regulation might
I

•

1\

'

'

'

'

84 .
See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
85.
Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 81.
36.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch, 404, 4·8 Stat gg 1 (codified as amended
a.t 15 U.S. C. §§ 78a-78hh) (1988)).
87 .
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6, 15 U.S .C. § 78 f. As noted earlier,
Self Regulatory Organization status is not limited to exchanges. The National Association
of Securities Dealers, for instance, is an association of securities professionals. For
convenience, l v!ill sometimes usc "exchange" and "SRO" interchangeably, since the
exchanges' status most closdy parallels the NCAA's.
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resolve controversial issues involving student-au1letes, contrast the
approach to external review m1d.er t.l-Je antitrust laws, and brietly describe
the practical barriers to adopting a system of securities-style regulation .

A. The Analogy Benveen th.e NCAA and the Exchanges
Tne Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gives the SEC authority to
regulate each entity registere-d as &"1 SRO. The SEC's role, as defin ed in
the Act, is to promote "'fair compet ition" a.rnong u'le various
constituencies of t!'1e exchanges, and to make sure that the exchai"lges take
appropriate steps to monitor for and prevent fraudulent practices. gs The
SEC's charge also includes related, :mbsid iary goals, such as ensuring
"fair representation "' on the bom·ds of the exchanges.
Alu1ough the SEC's power to achieve its antifraud &'1d procompetition objectives was originall y more constrained , the Comrnission
now has pervasive regulatory power. ln addition to being able to respond
to rules proposed by an exchange, for instance, the SEC can d irectly alter
an existing rule or promulgate an SEC rule with respect to a given
issue. 89 If the Commission views exchange regulation as inadequate, it
can force an exchange to enact a new rule.~ The SEC's response to the
rise of the options market is perhaps the best example of this last power.
As the options market dramatically expanded in the 1970s, many
observers feared that the absence of regulation created the potential for
widespread fraud . The SEC responded to the exchanges' failure to
develop safeguards by imposing a moratorium on new options until the
exchanges proposed a framework for overseeing this market. 91
Despite its wide-ranging authority, the SEC has traditionally
permitted the exchanges to retain a large measure of autonomy,
intervening relatively infrequentl y. 92 Although commentators have often

88.
!d. § 6(b)(5), 15 U .S.C . § 78f(b)(5); id. § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. §
78(o)(A)(b)(6) ; 6 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURrriES REOtTLATION 2788-93 (3d
ed. 1990).
89.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(c), 15 U.S.C . § 78s(c). For an
excellent overview and discussion of the SEC's powers under the 1934 Act, see David A.
Lipton, The SEC or the Exchange: Who Should Do What, and When? A Proposal to
Allocate Regulatory Responsibilities for Securities Markets, 16 U .C. DAVIS L. REv . 527,
531-37 (1983).
90.
See , e.g., Rule llb-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-5 (1994) .
91.
Lipton , supra note 89, at 550-54 .
92.
See, e.g., Timothy S. Hardy , Note, Infonnal Bargaining Process: An Analysis
of the SEC's Regulation of :he New York Stock Exchange, 80 YALE L .J . 811 (1971)
(suggesting that the SEC i§ generally prompte-d to act by scandals or the th reat of antitrust
scrutiny of the exchanges, and criticizing the informal processes the SEC and the New
York Stock Exchange ol'Len employ).
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called fo r a more active SEC role, most acknowledge that collaboration
between the exchanges and th~ SEC ofiers, at least in theory, important
advantages over exclusive regulation by u'1e SEC . Not only would direct
SEC regulation seriously ta;i the SEC 's ad rninistrative resources, but self
regulation has the .advantage of tapping into the expertise of the market
professionals who comprise an exchange. 93
A discussion of self regu lation in the securities industry is not likely
to immed iatel y bring the NCAA to mind. Yet even a brief comparison
reveals striking parallels. 'n"1e NCAA currentl y acts very much like a self
regulatory organization: it establishes rules for its members, regulates
NCAA athletic competition, and disciplines r.a:1embers t1'1 at fail to adhere
to NCAA sumdards. [. f Congress were to assert some form of regulatory
contro l over the NCA.A, mo-deiing the frznnework on the dual system used
•
• •
1
' rl
''r
>"l.-.
' • d
~
m
secuntJE\S
1aw
womu
oner
tue
same ::or1
s o f b enents
as exchange
regulation . Most irrlpm-tantly, treating the NCAA as a self regulatory
organization would ieave the business of nmning college athletics to those
with th e requisite expertise, yet would enable regulators to step in to
correct perceived inadequacies of NCAA oversight.
In addition to the theoretical attractions of treating the NCAA like a
self-regulating exchange, this approach also draws support from a
consideration of the remarkable historical and practical similarities
between these superficially dissimilar organizations. Both the NCAA and
the exchanges were originally set up and run as unincorporated
associations, and appear to have foregone incorporation at least in part to
minimize the likelihood of judicial interference with their internal
affairs. 94 By the time iawma.kers established federal authority to regulate
market operations during the New Deal, the New York Stock Exchange
(and to a lesser extent the other exchat1ges) was so well-entrenched that
displacing its regulatory rol e altogether would have been nearly
impossible as a practical matter. 95
The NCAA seems quite similar in this respect. Like the New York
Stock Exchange, L1e NCAA. has overseen college athletics for so long that
recognizing its continuing role may be a prerequisite for any effort to
provide for external regulatory review over intercollegiate athletics. 96

93.
See, e.g., Jennings, supra note 16; Lipton, supra note 89; Sam S. Miller, The
Self-Regulation of the Securi.ties i1ilarkets: A Critical Etamirzation, 42 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 853 (1985).
94.
Jennings, supra note 16, at &53 n.2. For a more complete discussion of the
NCAA's use of the association form, S<".AO supra part L
95.
SP.LlGMA.t'l, s1;,pra note 45 ; Jennings , supra note 16, at 669-70.
96.
As noted at the outset of this Article, the NCAA was established in 1905, and
has long regubted nearly all of collegiate athletics. See supra note 1 and accompanying
text.
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External regulation of the NC AA would obviously have a somewhat
different focus than SEC regul ation of the exchanges, yet one can easily
imagine what its general mission would be. In addition to an SEC-like
a.r1tifraud objective of ma.lcing sure that the NCAA adequately polices
member institutions ' compliance with NCi\A mles , regulators would also
scrutinize NCAA decisionrr.w.king (as well as the actions of its member
universities) from both economic and educational perspectives.
Regulators would address econo:mic issues such as the question whether
NCA. A regulations bear an appropriate relationsh ip to the NCAA's stated
objective of "preserving amatewrism. ,., From an educational standpoint,
regulators would ensure th at the NC AA takes appropriate steps to
integrate educational goals into intercoll egi.?,te athletics . In each of these
areas , regulators would pay particular attentio n to the role and
perspectives of student-athletes .
As in the exchctnge context, even an effective securities-style
framework for NCAA regul ation would face inevitable limitations. If
regulators defer too much to SRO expertise, they may fail to correct any
deficiencies in SRO regulation. Commentators have frequently criticized
the SEC's regulation of the exchanges along these lines, pointing out that
the SEC tends to exercise active and visible oversight only in the face of
a public scandal or other crisis. 97 On the other hand, aggressive
regulators run the risk of overly burdening the organization they are
charged with overseeing. Yet despite these Iimitations, one can easily
imagine an important role for dual regulation in the NCAA context, as I
discuss in detail below. 93

97.
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 93, at 861-63; Marianne K. Smythe, Government
Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Jndustly and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions
for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. R EV. 475, 499 (1984) (describing federal courts'
perception of the inadequacies of SEC regulation).
98.
Market forces counteract some of the regulatory deficiencies in the stock
exchange context. The New York Stock Exchange fa.ces intense competition from both
the other exchanges and market substitutes that have emerged in recent years. See
Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close
Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1007
(1990). These market forces give the New York Stock Exchange an incentive to regulate
efficiently, even if the SEC seems to have dropped the ball. Similarly, the NCAA may
be constrained to a certain extent by the professional sports leagues. In theory at least,
fans may tum to other sports if NCAA dec ision makers mismanage intercollegiate athletics.
Yet the market constraints on the NCAA seem significantly less forceful. The NCAA
(and the television networks) schedule the most vis ible NCAA sports so as not to compete
directly with professional sports, for ilJStance . More.-:wer, whatever constraints do exist
may not benefit many student-athletes. In fact, the professional sports l~gues may even
exacerbate student-athletes' relative powerlessness with resp--..,ct to some issues, since pro
sports indirectly benefit from limits on compensation and other restrictions imposed on
student-athletes at the collegiate level.
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B. The Role ThAt External Oversight .Mfight Play in the NCAA

Having described external oversight in gen~;ral terrns, it is useful to
examine in more detail what externBJ regulation of the NCAA might look
like. This section considers how securities-style regulation might
influence NCAA decisionmaking with respect to several of the most
prominent issues affecting (\n often confl.ktLng ways) student-athletes.
One of the most cxmtroversial issues in recen.t years has been th.e
question of student-athlete compensat~o n. Whil e the NCAA has long
defended its stringent limitations on compeDsat\on :::~s crucial to preserving
"'amateurismt? at the collegiate level, cri.tics have repeatedl y pointed out
the irony that these unpaid athl;;tes g-<;;n<:.'Flt.e huge revenues for the NCAA
and its mernber institutions, as well 8\S the hardsh ips the NCAA's
restrictions impose on poor student-athlete.:; in pMticula.r . Yet these
complaints have largely fa..llen on deaf e~xs.
One can easily imagine how securities-style regul ators might deal
with this issue. ·while regulators could unilateraJ !y alter the NCAA's
restrictions if they had roughly the same powers as the SEC, they would
presumably first pressure the NCAA to implement new rules. By analogy
to the SEC's approach in the options context, regulators might threaten
to remove aJl restrictions on compensation unless the NCAA devised a
new approach to compensation-one th at provided more flexibility on
issues such as pocket money and summer jobs, for instance, but preserved
the distinctions between intercollegiate and pro sports. The obvious
advantage of this approach is that it would enable the regulator to defer
to NCAA decisionmakers ' expertise rather than attempting to substitute
its own judgment, yet force the NCAA to address compensation issues
much more quickly than it is likely to do in the absence of external
pressure. 99
Other issues are sufficiently disconnected fro m the NCAA's expertise
and stated purpose that regulators need not defer to NCAA
decisionmaking. Consider, for example, the NCAA's rule terminating a
football player's college eligibility if he makes himself available for the

99.
The informal nature of much SEC regulation is not attractive to all observers.
For an extensive criticism of this asp=---ct of the self-regulation framework, see Hardy,
supra note 92. As the analysis in the text suggests, I am significantly more optimistic
about the efficacy of informal regulation. In my view, formalizing the regulatory process,
as Hardy proposes, would undermine incremental change and would inevitably invite more
res istance from the entity being regulated .
l do not mean to suggest by the examples l discuss in this section, however, that
regulators invariably would address and help solve the problems in question (though I
suspect they often would, at least in high-profile situations). My aim is me rely to show
the role regulators could plll.y.

I
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pro draft, regardless of whether a pro te;:.u-:n actual ly sei ects him. J()(l As
Carstensen a.tid Olszowka point out in their antitrust anal ysis , this rule
bears no obvious relationship to the NCAA 's intere.st in preserving
amateurism. 101 By terminating eligibility as of the moment the athlete
puts his name forward, the regu.lation simply tightefl..s the NCAA's rei.n...s
on its labor supply without providing any offsetting benefit, since ma11.y
athletes would forgo the draft rather t.h an risk losing tlJ.eir remaining
eligibility. An external regulator could either invalidate anticompethive
regulations such as this on·e, or compel the NCAA to do so itseif.
A third issue, gender equity and Title IX, implicates a mucb. broader
cross-section of student-ath1etes u1a.'l compensation and draft issues, wh ich
primarily concern stude:nt-atl-:!letes who participate in Division 1-A :football
and Division. I men's basketball. T itle IX has made cl ear that the
NCAA's member institutions must provide equal opportunities for both
men and women srudent-ath.ietes .w2 Tne NCAA's member institutions
have tended to respond to th·e Title IX mandate in notably piecemeal
fashion . Many have appeared to make only as many changes as are
necessary to forestall Title IX litigation, rather than genu inely to address
gender equity issues. Only when faced with or as a result of actual
litigation have some schools made sweeping changes. 103
Equitable treatment of men and women student-athletes is an issue
that NCAA decisionmakers should be ideally situated to address .

100.
1994-95 NCAA MAiWAL art. 12.2.4.2; see also Ethan Lock, NCAA
Eligibility Rules Send Braxston Banks Truckin', 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 643, 649 (1991)
(criticizing draft rule as designed to benefit universities by discouraging student-athletes
from making themselves available for draft).
101.
Carstensen & Olszowka , supra note 81, at 590. As my discussion of the
draft issue suggests, securities-style regulation would parallel antitrust review on many
issues-particularly those entailing a consideration of the competitive effect of NCAA
rules. For a more detailed comparison (and contrast), see infra part IV .C .
102.
Notice that gender equity is Rn issue with respect to which student-athletes
may have dramatically different interests . Equalizing men's and women's scholarnhips
benefits student-athletes who participate in historically underfunded women's sports .
Other student-athletes, on the other hand, generally those who play non-revenue men's
sports, may view this equalization as a threat to their sport. See, e.g., M i...lce Jensen, in
Sports, Equity Still Is an Issue, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 28, 1994, at Al (comparing
expenditures on men's and women's sports at six Philadelphia universities and de:Jcribing
e ffects of efforts to equali'le them).
103 .
Professor George describes this pattern of response and courts' tendency to
focus on the .. proportionality" of men 's and women's athletics programs ill her article for
this conference. B. Glenn George, W'no Pays aP'.d VVho Plays: Defming Equality in
[nJercollegiate Athletics, 1995 WIS. L. REv. 647 . For a detailed des.cription of recent
litigation, see Diane Heckman, J'he F.xplosion of Tule IX Legal Activuy in Intercollegiate
Athletics During 1992-93: Defining th~ "Equal Oppor!tmity" Standard, 1994 DET . C .L.
REv. 953.
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Unive r sities' :reluct:an>>e to ma k e dramatic changes
unilatera!l ly-partkuiarly if the changes reduce fund ing of revenue sports
such as footbal l and men's basketbal l-stems at least in part from a classic
collective action problem. Even if an individual university wished to shift
scholarships from men's football to women's spor'"LS, for instance, it might
hesitate to take such a step tor fear that it would put the university at a
competitiive disadvantage vis-a-vis other universities that failed to take
similar steps . 104 NCAA dedsiorunakers could theoretically address this
problem by ir.-1posi:r1g a uniform obligation on all schools . The NCAA
might al so experiment wit.h other ways of promoting gender equity, such
as basing NCAA championships in some sport..s on the combined
performance of the men's and •Nomen's teECms. 105
In contrast to this theon;tka1 promise, :the NCAA's general response
to th e recent 'wave of Title DC and other discrimination suits against
member institutions has been to articulate a general policy that members
comply wiL1 these lav;s, but otherwise to ieave members largely to their
own devices. 1(){j An external regulator might be a valuable antidote to
NCAA decisionmakers' current failure to take more aggressive action.
As wit.h compensation, a regulator could use its leverage to counteract the
current resistance to developing a meaningful approach at the NCAA
level.
Notice that, in addition to replacing member institutions' existing ad
hoc responses with a more consistent one, external regulation might also
provide for better decisionmaking with respect to gender issues. Under
existing law, courts have become the principal decisionmakers of gender
equity disputes . Yet gender equity issues are quite complex, and rather
than benefitting from a retroactive focus, require a forward-looking focus
that courts are not particularly well-situated to provide. The advantage
of external regulation is that it would force decisionmakers who have
more expertise than courts on issues of impmtance to student-athletes to
104.
For a classic account of collective action concerns of this sott, which uses an
illustration from competitive spnrts as a central metaphor, see Thomas C. Schelling,
Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A Study of Binary Choices
with Externalities, 17 J . CONFLlCf REsoL. 381 (1973).
See 'Jeorge, supra note 103, at 658 (discussing use of this approach in skiing
105.
championships as a means of avoiding zero sum perception that benefits to women's sports
must come at the expense of men's sp-orts).
Under its "Principle of Gender Equity," for instance, the NCAA states that
106.
u[I]t is the responsibility of each member institution to comply with Federal and state laws
regarding gender equity." 1994-95 NCAA MANUAL art. 2.3.1. The NCAA Manual goes
on to suggest that the NCA.A "should adopt legislation to enhance member institutions'
compliance with applicable gender-equity laws." !d. art. 2.3.2. In addition, the NCAA
has recently imposed a certification requirement, which requires each institution to
conduct a self-study to add ress various issues, including gender equity.
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develop a plan in the first instance. One suspects that courts woul d tend
to defer to the NCAA approach if an external regulator pressured NCAA
decisionmakers to develop a meaningful response to gender equity
concerns.
A final issue fl1rther illustrates how securities-style regulation might
make the NCAA more resp-onsive and effective in areas of concern to
student-athletes. One of the most consistent criticisms of the NCAA and
its member institutions is that they do not do enough to place educational
objectives at the heart of intercoil egi ate athletics. Itviany commentators
have argued that the emphasis on education nmst occur at the institutional
level, with universities providing academic oversight of their athletics
departments and offering scholarships only to student-·atbletes who can
reasonably be expected to succeed academically. 107
While unilateral, institutional level reform is crucial, securities-style
external regulation could play an important role in addressing educational
objectives, and in doing so hel p to counteract the risk that individual
universities whose administrators are not committed to change will
subvert its effectiveness. External regulators could require NCAA
decisionmakers to articulate specific educational responsibiliti es that a
university would have to its student-athletes. Universities might be
required, at least for revenue sport student-athletes, to extend a
scholarship to include summer school, as well as the period after the
student has completed her athletic eligibility. 103 The NCAA and its
member institutions have already taken a few tentative steps to achieve
educational objectives-some under congressional prodding-such as
requiring athletic recruiters to disclose the university's graduation rate for
student-athletes and related information to potential recruits. 109 An
external regulator might speed this process, and force NCAA
decisionmakers to focus much more explicitly on t..1e educational concerns
of student-athletes.

107.
Professors Allison and Davis both make arguments of this sort in their papers
for this conference. Allison, supra note 3; Davis, supra note 3.
108.
For a discussion of universities' refusal to give scholarship aid in these
situations, see Remington, supra note 36. A regulator might also encourage the NCAA
to play some role in defming the appropriate parameters of academic support services.
For one possible model of academic supp01i services, see Davis, supra note 3, at 618-19
(proposing that support services be overseen by an academic dean).
109.
Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act, Pub. L. No. 101-542, §
104, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 2381 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1085,
1092, 1094, 1232(g) (1988 & Supp. HI 1991)).
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C. Securities-Style Regulation as Co;npared to AntiTrust

As i noted at the outset of this Part, one important mechanism for
external regulation of NCAA decisionmaking ah:eady exists: the antitrust
laws. In this section I return to antitrust in order to compare this fonn
of external review to a frarne,..vork modelled on SEC oversight of the
stock exchanges. The comparison is particula..rly important given the
obstacles to implementating a securities-style framework, as the following
section discusses.
In many respects, the focus of a securities-Dtyle framework for the
NCAA would parallel that of the antitmst l avv~;, much as it does in the
stock exchange context. Like antitrust reg,rulators, a:.nd as discussed
earlier, a.'1 NCAA regulator 'lNOuld 5cmtiu1ize NCAA decisiorunaking to
ensure that NCAA regulations bear an appropriate celationship to the
NCAA's objective of provid ing a framework for aiTJateur intercollegiate
athletic competition. In areas 1..vhere l'ICAA 1egulations arguably do not
further this objective-such as its rules terminating the eligibility of
student-athletes who make themselves available for the pro football
draft-securities-style regulation and the antitrust laws both suggest that
such unnecessarily anticompetitive regulations should be struck down. 110
Yet securities-style regulation also offers several important
advantages over antitrust review. First, antitrust scrutiny is primarily
negative in nature; antitrust laws focus on whether coordination among
private actors has an impermissibly anticompetitive effect, and strike
down those actions that do. 111 By contrast, securities-style regulation
not only addresses these concerns, but it also can be used to develop
affirmative obligations. Perhaps the most obvious illustration of an
affirmative external regulatory strategy among the examples we have
considered is the enforcement of the NCAA's and universities'
educational obligation to student-athletes. 'INhereas antitrust regulation
would not have much to say about this responsibility , securities-style
regulators could, as we have discussed, deci;ise (or prompt NCAA
decisionmakers to devise) a framework for addressing educational issues
of concern to student-athl etes.
110.
See, e.g., Carstensen & Olszowka , supra note 31 , at 590.
111.
Carstensen and Olszowka recognize this limitatio n in their defense of antitrust
scrutiny as the best available mechanism for externa l regulation of the NCAA. Jd. at 581.
In fact, the limitations of antitrust seem even more significant than their relatively
optimistic view of its W(ely efficacy would suggest, given courts ' relative reluctance to
interfere with NCAA actions on antitrust grounds e;,cept in fairly egregious cases. See,
e.g., Davis, Intercollegiate Athletes, supra note 79 , at 306-08 (describing cases rejecting
antitrust challenges to various NCAA regulations) .

•
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A second advantage of securitie.s-sty!e regulation is closely rel.ated.
Even with respect to issues involving "'negative,., revie\v, st'".-eu:rities-style
regulators arguably can employ a more mJlli'1Ced appro~.ch. Cons ider the
issue of compensating athletes . H a court concluded that the NCAA
regulations constituted an imperrnissible restraint of trade under the
antitrust laws, it ordinarily would simply invalidate t.1.e regulations ,
perhaps with in..structions as to what kinds of restrictions might be more
likely to withstand an antitrust challenge. Ratl1er thai1 simply striking
down the regulations, securitir..s-style regulators could vv·ork wit.h the
NCAA and tap NCAA decisiomnakers' expertise in developing a more
reasonable approach to compensation of student-athl etes. 112
This affirrD.ative, collaborative facet of securities-style reg-vJation also
could play an important role in resolving issues not covere-.ri by antitrust
law. Title IX issues involving student-athletes are illustrative in u'lis
respect. As discussed ~arlier, securities-style reguiators could pressure
NCAA decisionmakers to develop a coherent, overarching framework for
addressing gender equity issues such as the question of what achieving
equal opportunity for men's and women's athletics requires.
While this anal ysis suggests that securities-style regulation
theoretically offers several advantages over antitrust, I do not mean to
suggest that the antitrust laws would prove irrelevant. As occurs with
SEC regulation of the stock exchanges, antitrust scrutiny still could play
an important role in settling issues that regulators have not addressed. 113
In addition, the SEC often does not act until a scandal or the threat of
antitrust challenge focuses attention on an issue. 114 Although some
commentators see this as a flaw in SEC regulation, it also suggests that
antitrust scrutiny is a desirable stimulant to regulatory intervention.

D. Practical Obstacles to Securities-Style Regulation

This Part began with a somewhat improbable analogy: the suggestion
that the NCAA bears an intriguing resemblance to the New York Stock
Exchange and the oL1er exchanges. I have attempted to show that the
same regulatory strategy used in the exchange context could prove
112.
The SEC has played a similar role on occasion in the sec urities context. As
discussed earlier, for instance, the SEC pressured the exchanges to develop regulations
in response to concerns about misbehavior in the options markets. See supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (insisting on
113.
an "analysis which reconciles the operation of both statutory schemes . . . rather than
holding one completely ousted"); Smythe, supra note 97 (proposing a framewo rk for
integrating antitrust scrutiny with SEC reguiation of the exchanges).
114.
See supra note 92 .
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remarkably effective in addressing issues of particular concern to studentat'f}letes, and that it offers advantages even over external review under the
a...J.titrust laws. Yet it is important to recognize both the costs and the
potential obstacles to securities-style regulation.
The direct costs of securities-style regulation are u1e costs of hiring
new regulators and running a new enforcement office. In addition,
securities-style regulation is onJy as effective as its administrators. As
noted earlier, some commentators view SEC regulation of the exchanges
a.s insufficiently vigilant.
The more importar1t issue, however, is the political question of
whether Congress would implement such <1 framework. Two observations
illustrate the resistance such a proposal would face. First, in exploring
tJw i!'!nalogy between the NCAA and the exchanges, 1 touched only briefly
on the conditions t."lat led to SEC oversight of th.e exchanges. The
.securities acts were passed in the wake of the massive market collapse
that ushered in the Depression. Given that the market crash was a.Ai
aspect and important symbol of the overall econo mic breakdown,
politicians and the public strongly believed that something needed to be
done to regulate the exchanges. 115 In striking contrast, the problems of
student-athl etes and intercollegiate athletics, while significant, are not
nearly so dire. Similarly, intercollegiate athletics involves large sums of
money in absolute terms, but its economic significance pales in
comparison with the New York Stock Exchange and the other exchanges.
Second, the current political climate would be particularly hostile to
a cal l to create a new agency or expand an existing one in order to force
more effective NCAA action on issues of concern to student-athletes.
One obvious candidate for expansion to encompass securities-style
regulation of the NCAA, for instance, is the Department of Education,
given the concern that NCAA decisionmakers and universities place a
greater premium on educational objectives. Yet the Department of
Education is one of the agencies most frequently mentioned as a candidate
for elimination in the effort to downsize the federal government. 116
Nevertheless, securities-style regulation cannot simply be dismissed .
As we have seen, this approach offers striking benefits. Whereas the
NCAA currently tends to make changes only in the face of adverse public
opinion or congressional hearings, securities-style regulation would create
115.
My thanks to Alice Abreu for emphasizi:1g this point. See SELIGMAN, supra
note 45, at ix, 75, 92. Passage was further smoothed by the Pecora he<1rings, which
highlighted alleged abuses in the banking industry. ld. at 1-3g.
116.
From a slightly different persp<'"...ctive, these observations can be seen as
aspxts of a historical path dependence issue. Having left the primary regulation of
NCAA athletics to the private sphere for so long, Congress is less W(e!y to shift ge<1rs
now, and to establish extensive governmental oversight of intercollegiate athletics.
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a more systematic incentive to address concerns about l\ICAA regulation.
An amateur athletics commission might play this role with respect to both
the NCAA and other amateur athletics organizations. Such a step would
be dramatic, but given the problems not only with the NCAA but with
American sports generally, it is not unimaginabl e.
It is interesting to note in this regard that there is a recurring threat
that one or more major conferences might secede from the NCAA rather
than continue to subject their programs to its restrictions. And it is
debatable how necessary the NCAA real ly is, given the widely divergent
perspectives of its members and how far it has moved from its original
purposes in the context of revenue-producing sports . In view of this, it
is certainly possible that the NCAA's member institutions will eventually
agree to external review as the price of its continued existence, or that
secession will prompt a call for at least limited securities-style regulation.

V.

CONCLUSlOl"l

As a purely conceptual matter, securities-style regulation is in some
respects the most attractive of the corporate and securities law approaches
this Article has considered. Securities-style regulators could oversee the
NCAA and its member institutions on an ongoing basis, and as a result
both strike down unnecessarily anticompetitive NCAA rules, and force the
NCAA to focus more closely on educational and other concerns of
student-athletes . Because this approach would require a major shift in
oversight, however, its implementation faces significant practical obstacles
under current conditions.
By contrast, the internal corporate governance devices, direct
representation of and fiduciary duty litigation by student-athletes, both
would have a less dramatic effect. Yet each is quite plausible as a
practical matter, and the NCAA already appears to be moving toward
some form of direct representation. Of the two approaches, fiduciary
duty claims seem particularly promising. While fiduciary duty litigation
is subject to several possible limitations, and is not a cure-all for the
concerns of student-athletes, it offers appreciable advantages over existing
constitutional law approaches, as well as over somewhat similar causes of
action such as contract-based arguments and antitrust scrutiny. Not only
might it result in an articulation of t--ICAA and member institutions'
obligations to student-athletes, but it also could be used to scrutinize the
process pursuant to wh ich NCAA and member institution decisionmakers
act. Student-athletes' abil ity to obtain lawyers to pursue fiduciary duty
claims would be significantly enhanced if Congress were to pass
legislation giving attorneys fees to successful plaintiffs; but even in the
absence of such legislation, a nu mber of student-athletes could, and
should, add this approach to their existing strategies.

